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Abstract 
 
Drawing on institutional and transaction cost theory and the resource-based view of CSR, I 
posit that CSR performance across global emerging market companies is positively related to 
firm valuation. Using an unbalanced panel data approach for a sample with 3,800 firm-year 
observations representing 657 individual firms from 20 different countries that are classified as 
emerging markets according to the MSCI EM index during 2010-2016, I find that CSR 
performance, proxied by the average of the environmental and social pillar scores of the 
Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG rating database, positively relates to firm valuation, proxied by 
one-year ahead Tobin’s q (TOBQ). Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
normalised CSR performance is – on average – associated with a 0.042-point increase in TOBQ. 
Compared to the mean value of 1.661 for TOBQ across the sample, this increase constitutes an 
economically significant share of around 2.5% of that value. This value-enhancing effect of 
CSR is driven by companies in Asia, while it is absent for companies located in EMEA and 
more pronounced for companies of the Americas. Additional analyses further reveal that while 
overall Thomson Reuters corporate governance score performance is positively related to firm 
valuation, the way in which these scores are constructed seems to fail to reflect important 
differences in the governance environment of emerging market companies compared to their 
developed market counterparts. Moreover, the number of sell-side analysts covering the stock 
of these companies is (next to CSR) positively related to firm valuation but has a mitigating 
effect on the positive relation between CSR performance and firm valuation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Global institutional investors acting in the long-term interests of their beneficiaries increasingly 
incorporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) aspects in their investment analyses 
and portfolio selection processes, next to traditional economic factors. Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) closely relates to the environmental and social non-financial performance 
dimensions and is often defined as a mechanism to address externalities that firms generate in 
the process of pursuing profit maximization that are not internalized by shareholders (Lian and 
Renneboog, 2017). To incorporate ESG aspects into their investment decisions, portfolio 
managers often rely on information intermediaries such as ESG rating agencies or analyst 
reports. According to Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) ESG, for example, 31 of 
the top 50 institutional money managers worldwide use their research to integrate CSR factors 
into their investment decisions (Kim, Li, and Li, 2014). 
From a firm perspective, the central theme academics inspect is the relationship between 
corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). The initial 
debate revolves around two contradicting views of the firm and the function of CSR, the 
resource-based view and the negative view. The resource-based view states that CSR 
investments create necessary resources and stakeholder support (e.g. Jones, 1995), that translate 
into sustainable long-term competitive advantage and thus higher financial performance 
through more favourable return and/or risk profiles (e.g. Waddock and Graves (1997); Russo 
and Fouts, 1997; Deng, Kang, and Low, 2010). On the other hand, the negative view suggests 
that companies should not internalize the negative externalities they exert on other stakeholders 
than shareholders, as doing so conflicts the sole responsibility of firms to maximize shareholder 
value (e.g. Pigou, 1920; Friedman, 1970).  
The rationale of the resource-based view is that CSR investments create intangible assets 
through various channels. Continuous stakeholder-management relationships induced by CSR 
properly incentivizes mangers to focus on financial goals (Hill and Jones, 1992; Jones, 1995), 
builds moral capital or goodwill amongst stakeholders in good times to draw on in worse times 
(e.g. Godfrey, 2005), stipulates reporting information quality and disclosure (e.g. Gelb and 
Strawser, 2001) and builds a reputation for quality, reliability, and trust in the market 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Facilitated by the severe erosion of investor wealth and 
numerous shutdowns of businesses during crises periods and their frequent occurrence, the 
research on CSR activity shifted away from an initial return focussed debate towards the effect 
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of CSR on firm risk characteristics. Specifically, recent studies on the CSP CFP debate focus 
on stock price crash risk (Kim et al., 2014; Diemont, Moore, and Soppe, 2016; Zhang, Xie, and 
Xu, 2016; Lee, 2016; Utz, 2017) and span over stock market boom periods (1995–1999 and 
2003–2007) and/or burst periods (2000–2002 and 2008–2009). At the same time, studies point 
out that institutional differences between countries and regions drive the observed differences 
in the extent, content, and communication intensity of CSR between companies (e.g. Liang and 
Renneboog, 2017). 
Institutions, or specialized intermediaries in an economy emerge in response to mitigate the 
various transaction costs associated with market failures in the economic exchange process 
arising from negotiating, monitoring, and enforcement costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 
1985; Jones and Hill, 1988). Formal market-supporting institutions, such as capital markets, 
regulatory systems, and contract enforcement mechanisms across global emerging markets are 
generally weaker compared to developed markets (e.g. Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 
2009). This results in business being guided rather by informal institutions such as business 
groups, family connections and government contacts, which often creates governance concerns 
via family- or government-controlled companies and ultimately hinders the proper protection 
of minority shareholder rights (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Jiang, 2008). That is why 
investors taking a minority stake in emerging market companies endure higher transaction and 
monitoring costs of their investments compared to equivalent investments in developed markets 
(e.g. Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Faccio, Lang, and Young, 2001). 
Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2011) argue that in emerging market companies must develop 
strategic responses to overcome undue transaction costs and restricted access to resources 
caused by the absence of market-supporting institutions. Strategic responses could be to build 
a reputation of treating minority shareholders fairly (Gomes, 2000), strategic alliances with 
foreign multinationals from countries with strong institutions (Siegel, 2009), geographical 
clustering to create local business environments (Karna, Täube, and Sonderegger, 2013), 
expanding the business abroad to access more efficient and munificent foreign markets (Luo 
and Tung, 2007), or signalling commitment to fair practices by voluntary cross-listings on 
exchanges with strong monitoring standards (Young et al., 2008). The very recent study of El 
Ghoul, Guedhami, and Kim (2017) finds that CSR commitment is another strategic response to 
reduce transaction costs and to tap additional resources. Specifically, they show empirically 
that CSR performance is more positively related to firm valuation in countries with lower 
market-supporting institutions.  
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While CSR awareness has been traditionally attributed to be confined to developed 
societies/economies in the academic landscape (e.g. Arya and Zhang, 2009), momentum is 
pronouncing the relevance of CSR across emerging markets. A recent CEO study of Lacy and 
Hayward (2011) on the topic of sustainability in partnership with United Nations Global 
Compact (UNGC) shows that more CEOs of emerging market companies describe 
sustainability as important to their company’s future success compared to developed market 
companies. The McKinsey Global Institute (2010) further argues that the demand for growth 
capital across global emerging markets is expected to keep surging for the foreseeable future, 
so emerging market companies keep on seeking investments from ESG sensitive investors 
abroad. Moreover, increasingly international supply chains and business ties between emerging 
and developed market companies draw attention from Western societies to the responsibility of 
emerging market suppliers of Western companies (e.g. Bogdanich, 2008; Perez-Batres, Miller, 
and Pisani, 2010). Moreover, the emergence of emerging market multinationals such as 
Embraer, Tata, Alibaba and Haier gain considerable world-wide attention and increasingly fall 
under the same CSR scrutiny as their Western counterparts. 
Combining the recent finding of El Ghoul et al. (2017) that CSR performance is more positively 
related to firm valuation in countries with lower market-supporting institutions with the fact 
that global emerging markets – while cross-country differences exists – are characterized by 
weaker institutions and the ongoing societal and organizational shift towards more CSR 
sensitivity in these societies, theory strongly points towards a positive relationship between 
CSR performance and firm value across global emerging market firms as a group. Yet, there is 
no previous study examining the CSP and CFP debate in the context of global emerging markets 
as a group. This is probably due to the failure to recognize institutional commonalities across 
global emerging market companies, ESG data scarcity in emerging markets and the extremely 
volatile capital markets in the last decade steering the focus on risk characteristics. This thesis 
closes this research gap by examining the research question whether CSR performance across 
global emerging market companies increases their firm valuation. 
In the main empirical analysis, I use an unbalanced panel data approach for a sample of 3,800 
firm-year observations representing 657 individual firms from 20 different countries that are 
classified as emerging markets according to the MSCI EM index during 2010-2016. In line with 
previous research (e.g. Kim et al., 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2017; Utz, 2017), CSR is defined as 
the average of the Thomson Reuters EIKON environmental and social pillar scores. I use 
Tobin’s q (TOBQ), which is the market value of the firm’s assets divided by the replacement 
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value of the firm’s assets as firm value proxy for financial performance, as it should capture 
return and risk effects of CSR in aggregate (e.g. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; El Ghoul 
et al., 2017). I follow previous studies in controlling for return on assets, firm size, leverage, 
GDP of the respective head quarter country, and firm age. I find that CSR performance 
positively relates to firm valuation. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
normalised CSR score performance is – on average – associated with a 0.042-point increase in 
one-year ahead TOBQ. A robustness check of year-by-year regressions with ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates confirms this result. However, this result is largely driven by the Asian 
companies representing around 60% of the sample. Companies located in EMEA representing 
20% of the sample do not show any value enhancing effect of CSR and companies located in 
the Americas representing the remaining 20% of the sample show an especially strong value 
enhancing effect of CSR.  
Additionally, this thesis inspects the role of firm-level governance on firm valuation in 
emerging markets. Institutional theory suggests that the need for effective internal corporate 
governance is especially high in countries where institutional voids inhibit market oversight or 
external governance mechanisms (Ding, Wi, Li, and Jia, 2010). However, the ESG rating scores 
of Thomson Reuters are constructed via a consistent criteria list which is based on the 
predominant corporate governance model of developed markets, where principal-agent (PA) 
problems between owners and managers receive most attention (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In contrast, concentrated ownership of states and families in emerging markets is often the root 
cause of expropriation of minority shareholders, which Young et al. (2008) term principal-
principal (PP) problems. A dissection of the overall governance score into its three categories 
management, shareholders, and CSR strategy shows while the consolidated corporate 
governance performance measure has a positive effect on firm value, there is some evidence 
for a negative effect of the Shareholders score. This finding supports the view of Faccio et. al 
(2001) that power towards shareholders vs. managers in emerging markets might not be as 
positive as is believed according to developed markets theory.  
Furthermore, this thesis inspects the role of sell-side analyst coverage on CSR and firm 
valuation in an additional analysis. Using the same unbalanced panel approach for a reduced 
sample with 3,504 firm-year observations reveals that analyst coverage is positively related to 
firm valuation – next to CSR. Including an interaction term further shows that the number of 
analysts has a mitigating effect on the positive relationship between CSR and firm value, while 
the previously found positive effects stay significant. Taken together, these findings support the 
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view of Chung and Jo (1996) and Yu (2008), that equity analysts act as an external monitor and 
help reduce transaction costs by reducing agency conflicts, disciplining managers and steering 
investor attention towards important information. While analysts seem to provide some 
additional social pressure on firms to reduce their irresponsible activities and signal trust in the 
proper governance of the firm, they rather complement than substitute ESG rating agencies as 
information intermediaries by focussing on financial reporting irregularities. 
This thesis enhances the current academic debate and is highly relevant for practitioners such 
as portfolio managers of institutional investors and managers. From an academic perspective, 
the main analysis of my thesis contributes to the current stance of research by revitalizing the 
deadlocked CSP and CFP debate in developed markets. First, it is the first study to provide 
empirical evidence for the resource-based view of CSR in the so far untouched post-financial 
crisis period of 2010-2016. Second, it is the first study that examines the link between CSR 
performance and firm value across global emerging markets. It implies for future research that 
CSR awareness is present across global emerging markets and that superior CSP enhances firm 
value for global emerging market companies as a group. At the same time, it shows that large 
regional differences in this link do exist and that there is a need for more extensive ESG data to 
conduct meaningful statistical analyses on regional level. 
Furthermore, it provides confirmatory evidence for the proposed link between institutions and 
transaction costs proposed by El Ghoul et al. (2017) and implies that future research on CSR 
should recognize that the effectiveness of CSR performance channels depends on the 
institutional context of the economy where the company is located in. The additional analysis 
on firm-level governance ratings implies that future research on corporate governance should 
recognize that institutions, amongst other factors, effect the governance requirements of 
companies and the ways in which those can be resolved. Finally, the additional analysis on the 
role of sell-side analysts implies that future research should recognize that both analyst 
coverage and CSR performance help reduce transaction costs and tap additional resources in 
emerging markets and are complementarily valued by the market. 
From a practitioner’s perspective, my findings imply that portfolio managers of institutional 
investors allocating capital to emerging market equities should pick stocks of companies with 
strong future CSR capabilities, large analyst coverage, and conduct firm-level governance 
analyses considering PP problems rather than (relying on generic governance scores based 
primarily on) PA problems and generally treat Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG scores in their 
investment decisions with caution. My support for the resource-based view calls managers of 
10 
 
emerging markets companies to strive for CSR excellence to reduce transaction costs, tap 
additional resources, and access desired growth capital.  
This thesis is structured as follows. Section two presents the academic literature relating to the 
research question at hand in more detail. Additionally, four hypotheses relating to the research 
question above are developed. Section three details the sample construction process and the 
methodology used to empirically test the hypotheses developed in section two. Section four 
presents the descriptive statistics of the constructed sample and the inferential statistics of the 
empirical tests of the four hypotheses. Furthermore, a robustness check for the baseline 
hypothesis is conducted. In section 5, the statistical results are interpreted in the context of the 
introduced literature and limitations of the analysis are discussed. Section 6 synthesizes the 
previous sections by concluding on the implications of this study and provides motivation for 
future research.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
The literature review is structured as follows. In the first section, often-misused terminology in 
the CSR realm is clarified. In the second section, an overview of the origins and subsequent 
developments of the CSP and CFP debate and recent advancements in ESG data availability is 
presented. In the third section, the literature on CSR in the societal, organizational, and 
institutional context of emerging markets is reviewed. The fourth and last section combines the 
previously presented insights on the CSP and CFP debate and the institutional context of 
emerging markets to hypothesize the effect of CSR on firm value across global emerging 
markets. Furthermore, it elaborates on the role of firm-level governance, sell-side analysts, and 
institutional ownership on this relationship. 
 
2.1 CSR in the context of SRI and ESG 
There is an increasing trend of institutional investors acting in the long-term interests of their 
beneficiaries towards investment strategies often grouped into and termed Sustainable, 
Responsible and Impact (SRI) investing (USSIF, 2016). SRI investing includes the 
incorporation of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) aspects in the investment 
analyses and portfolio selection processes of institutional investors, next to traditional economic 
factors. On top of that, institutional investors increasingly engage in active ownership, i.e. they 
promote ESG amongst their portfolio companies either by informal influence or formally by 
filing or co-filing of shareholder resolutions concerning ESG issues (Dimson, Karakaş, and Li, 
2015). In its 2016 report, USSIF exemplarily shows the immense growth of SRI investing. US-
domiciled assets under management using SRI strategies grew by 33% from 2014 to 2016 to 
USD 8.72 trillion, which is a 14-fold increase since 1995. The SRI assets in 2016 represent 
nearly 22% of all tracked U.S. assets under professional management. 
The increase in SRI investing can be observed not only in the U.S., but also internationally. By 
signing the Principles of Responsible Investments (PRI), who were developed by institutional 
investors in conjunction with the United Nations Secretary-General, investors voluntarily 
commit to promote ESG aspects among all companies they are invested in. On its website it 
states that the assets managed by institutional investors which committed to the PRIs amount 
to around USD 80 trillion and nearly 2250 signatories spread over all continents in 2018 
(UNPRI, 2018). This illustrates that ESG screening and shareholder activism towards more 
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sustainable business practices of investees has become mainstream practice. Looking at this 
trend from a company’s point of view, ESG excellence has never been more vital in attracting 
capital. Therefore, it is no surprise that especially large multinational enterprises (MNEs) of 
both developed and developing countries have been increasingly incorporating interests of a 
variety of stakeholders in their strategic decision-making processes over the last decade (Liang 
and Renneboog, 2017).  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is often defined as a mechanism to address externalities 
that firms generate in the process of pursuing profit maximization that are not internalized by 
shareholders (Lian and Renneboog, 2017). These externalities span over a variety of activities 
contained in the environmental and social pillars of ESG, but are conceptually different from 
the governance pillar. This is due to the firm-intern nature of corporate governance structures 
which do not directly create externalities of society’s concern, but directly affect shareholders 
(Flammer, 2013). To illustrate, firms polluting rivers nearby communities use as drinking water 
(environmental) or making use of child labour in less developed countries (societal) 
immediately and negatively affect the wider society. However, firms having fewer independent 
directors in their board primarily concern shareholders of these firms, not society at large. 
CSR definitions further pronounce that the need for companies to address externalities arises 
from the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society places on them 
(Kim et al., 2014; Liang and Renneboog, 2017). Societal expectations on firms to act 
responsibly have increased significantly over time and consequently, corporate social 
responsibility has increasingly become a mainstream business activity (Kitzmueller and 
Shimshack, 2012). CSR activities aimed at fulfilling these expectations span over a multitude 
of dimensions, such as providing employee benefits, investing in environmentally-friendly 
production processes, preventing the use of child labour along the supply chain, supporting 
NGOs or establishing foundations specialized in cultural and educational support in less 
developed countries (e.g. Liang and Renneboog, 2017). 
In short, ESG summarizes the non-financial performance dimensions of a firm about which SRI 
investors care. CSR can be viewed as a subpart of ESG relating to the environmental and social 
dimensions which affect society at large, while governance issues are of more firm-intern 
nature. After having established an understanding of the differences in perspectives and 
concepts between SRI, ESG, and CSR, I turn to the academic research on these topics. Due to 
the conceptual differences in CSR and the governance categories of ESG, I separately elaborate 
on these issues in the following sequences. I primarily inspect the debate that has been receiving 
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the greatest attention, which is the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) 
and corporate financial performance (CFP). In additional analyses, I further inspect the role of 
internal corporate governance, the role of sell-side analysts, and the role of institutional 
ownership in the relationship between CSP and CFP across global emerging markets. In the 
next sequence, I provide an overview of the origins and subsequent developments of the CSP 
and CFP debate. 
 
2.2 The long-standing debate on CSP and CFP 
2.2.1 CSR and stock performance 
There are two general contradicting standpoints regarding the role of CSR. On the one hand, 
the resource-based view states that CSR investments create necessary resources and stakeholder 
support (e.g. Jones, 1995) that can translate into sustainable long-term competitive advantage 
and thus higher financial performance (e.g. Waddock and Graves (1997); Russo and Fouts, 
1997; Deng, Kang, and Low, 2010). On the other hand, the negative view suggests that 
companies should not internalize the negative externalities they exert on other stakeholders than 
shareholders, such as communities, employees, or the environment. According to them, doing 
so would conflict the sole responsibility of firms, which is to maximize shareholder value (e.g. 
Pigou, 1920; Friedman, 1970). Theoretical arguments through which exact channels CSR might 
lead to either superior or inferior stock performance are manifold.  
Proponents of the resource-based view argue that continuous stakeholder-management 
relationships induced by CSR serve as monitoring and enforcement mechanism that focuses 
managers on financial goals (Hill and Jones 1992; Jones 1995). This is related to the good-
governance view according to which CSR investments are a signal of properly incentivized and 
governed managers who contribute to better firm performance (Ferell, Liang, and Renneboog, 
2016). According to the internal resources/learning perspective CSR activities may help to build 
managerial competencies because it necessitates significant employee involvement, 
organization-wide coordination, and a forward-thinking managerial style (Shrivastava 1995). 
Managers who acquired these capabilities are better equipped to adapt to external changes, 
turbulences, and crises (Russo and Fouts, 1997). According to the reputation perspective, CSR 
acts a tool to build a positive image with customers, investors, bankers, and suppliers which 
facilitate their access to capital (Fombrun and Shanley 1990) and builds a reputation for quality, 
reliability, and trust in the market (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). 
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Proponents of the negative view argue that CSR expenditures are simply as a waste of scarce 
resources, as they increase operating costs, represent a manifestation of agency problems, are 
time-consuming and distract managers from their core responsibilities (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). Empirical studies find that managers benefit at the expense 
of shareholders by engaging in inappropriate CSR conduct which is self-serving as they choose 
projects which earn them a good personal reputation and desired social networks among key 
stakeholders, rather than supporting the firm (Krueger, 2015). Moreover, managers are inclined 
to overinvest in CSR to enhance their firm’s sustainability rating to reduce the probability of 
their replacements in the future (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). Other studies criticize the resource-
based causality and propose an inverse positive relationship, meaning that only well-performing 
firms can afford to invest in CSR (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 2012). They reason that 
deciding on CSR expenditures often represents an area of relatively high managerial discretion, 
so that the initiation or cancellation of voluntary social and environmental policies depends to 
a large extent on the availability of excess funds (McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis, 1988). 
Empirically, these early studies often compare returns of sustainable mutual funds or 
sustainability indices with their conventional counterparts. However, these studies fail to 
establish an academic consensus. Some studies find little support (e.g. Cummings, 2000) for 
superior risk-adjusted returns, some studies contest no significant differences between them 
(e.g. Sauer, 1997) and some find inferior returns for sustainable firms (e.g. Brammer, Brooks, 
and Pavelin, 2006). Despite the absence of an academic consensus, the continuing above-
described trend of increasing capital commitments to SRI investment vehicles favours the view 
that CSR has some form of value. Facilitated by the severe erosion of investor wealth and 
numerous shutdowns of businesses during crises periods and their frequent occurrence in more 
than ever interconnected global financial markets such as the recent sequence of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, the Nasdaq internet bubble in 2000 and the global financial crisis in 2008, the 
research on CSR activity shifted away from the deadlocked return debate towards the effect of 
CSR on firm risk characteristics. 
 
2.2.2 CSR and firm risk characteristics 
Proponents of the resource-based view argue that – even though CSP might not directly impact 
observable returns – socially responsible firms have a more favourable risk profile (Goss and 
Roberts, 2011). Empirical studies find that CSR performance is on average associated with 
lower idiosyncratic risk and lower probability of financial distress (Lee and Faff, 2009), lower 
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cost of capital (e.g. El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011), lower stock price crash 
risk (e.g. Kim et al., 2014; Utz, 2017), and increased analyst following and access to 
institutional capital (Bushee and Noe, 2000). Two literature streams to provide rationale in 
favour of this risk mitigation view of CSR evolved: higher information quality and the building 
of moral capital.  
Studies supporting the information quality rationale find that socially responsible firms suffer 
less from earnings management, have higher financial reporting quality, less overconfident 
managers, and disclose more financial information (Gelb and Strawser, 2001; Kim, Park, and 
Wier, 2012; McCarthy, Oliver, and Song, 2017). Moreover, Waddock and Graves (1997) argue 
that CSR investments can have a signalling effect of manager’s commitment to reduce 
principal-agency conflicts which reduces the perceived risk of investors.  
Studies relating to moral capital building argue that CSR investments can reduce risk exposure 
through insurance-like protection in bad times by generating moral capital or goodwill among 
stakeholders in good times (e.g. Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009; Attig, El 
Ghoul, Guedhami, and Suh, 2013). In this context, moral capital spans over a variety of 
intangible internal resources such as effective employee commitment, legitimacy among 
communities and regulators, trust among partners and suppliers, credibility and enhanced brand 
equity among customers, and more attractiveness for investors (Godfrey, 2005). Attig, Cleary, 
El Ghoul, and Guedhami (2014) support this view by finding empirically that responsible firms 
are less exposed to legal, regulatory, and reputational risks and ultimately exhibit more stable 
cash flows. Flammer (2013) finds that environmental commitments alleviate the consequences 
of bad news event. Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2017) find that socially responsible firms 
benefitted from higher levels of trust during the global financial crisis, translating into less 
severe stock return drops, higher profitability, growth and sales per employee and better access 
to debt. 
Proponents of the of the negative view on CSR disagree and state that management may use 
highly discretionary CSR activities to conceal firm misbehaviour, which increases financial risk 
once this bad news hoarding is detected (Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004). Opposing the 
information quality argument, other studies find empirical support for a positive relationship 
between CSR activities and earnings management (e.g. Petrovits, 2006; Prior, Surroca, and 
Tribó, 2008).  
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2.2.3 Advancements in ESG data quality/availability 
Due to the increasing demand for reliable and extensive information on ESG and CSR of 
investors, several data providers collect firm-level ESG information and construct scores to 
make firms comparable along these non-financial performance dimensions. The ESG rating 
agencies provide rating services, research, compliance and consulting services analogous to 
those provided by credit rating agencies – but with a focus on ESG criteria. The three most 
relevant ESG rating providers are Thomson Reuters EIKON (including formerly ASSET4), 
MSCI ESG (including formerly Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Research & Analytics (KLD)), 
and Bloomberg. Since the past decade, the ESG rating industry has been growing tremendously 
and it has been consolidating. This is no surprise as addressing ESG issues has become a risk-
management concern for investors, shareholder, governments and firms and academics have 
been increasingly focussing on ESG aspects (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). Thereby, 
databases increase significantly in value with their coverage. Consolidating databases creates 
positive synergies or might have even been necessary to survive in this data and research-driven 
industry. 
The emergence of more and more comprehensive ESG rating databases also changed the 
academic landscape considerably. Early studies compared SRI indices, SRI investment funds, 
or self-constructed ESG portfolios or funds with their conventional counterparts in terms of 
risk-adjusted returns. The researchers mostly used econometrical frameworks like cross-
sectional Fama and MacBeth regressions or some Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
extension like the Carhart four-factor model. In comparison to these regression techniques with 
binary ESG inclusion dummy variables, ESG rating scores have the advantage that they provide 
scalable and firm-specific data, which results in large panel data sets (Halbritter and Dorfleitner, 
2015). That is why most recent research published in leading journals relating to the CSR 
literature stream in advanced markets relies on these ESG ratings and panel data statistics (e.g. 
Kim et al., 2014; Utz, 2017). For emerging markets, the availability of large-scale data over 
long periods of time is substantially less extensive as these rating providers have only been 
gradually extending their coverage of firms from developed to emerging markets. However, 
there are very recent papers who do exploit these advancements in ESG data availability for 
individual emerging markets and construct data panels (Lee, 2016; Zhang, Xie, and Xu, 2016). 
It is important to recognize that independent of the individual aspects considered and 
methodologies used, there is still no consensus on the relationship between CSP and CFP. 
However, there is consensus amongst academics that the extent, content, and communication 
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intensity of CSR differs significantly not only across corporations, but also across regions, and 
countries (Maignan and Ralston, 2002). Therefore, before conducting an empirical study across 
global emerging markets, it is essential to review the societal, organizational, and institutional 
context of emerging versus developed markets. 
 
2.3 CSR in the societal, organizational, and institutional context of emerging 
markets 
2.3.1 Cross-country differences in CSR activity 
While CSR studies initially focussed on developed markets, emerging markets have been 
increasingly receiving attention (e.g. Welford, 2004; Baughn, Bodie, and McIntosh, 2007; Qu, 
2007). Still, the empirical research on the impact and relevance of corporate social 
responsibility in emerging markets is still very limited (Arya and Zhang, 2009). The few early 
studies are sceptical towards CSR sensitivity in emerging markets. They claim that emerging 
market companies engage less in CSR activities than developed market companies due to lower 
economic development levels (e.g. Welford, 2004). The reasoning usually posits that lower 
income levels, less awareness of and sophistication about social and environmental problems, 
lower levels of product variety, and greater emphasis on the basic value proposition of products 
all contribute to less CSR sensitivity in emerging markets (e.g. Baughn et al., 2007). Moreover, 
- with reference to the inverse positive relationship of CSP and CFP proposed by McGuire et. 
al (1988) – they argue that emerging market firms might have less availability of excess funds 
and therefore simply not the “luxury” to engage in CSR. 
Research shifted subsequently towards the determinants of observed cross-country differences 
in CSR activity. For example, Liang and Renneboog (2017) find that firms from common law 
countries have lower CSR ratings than companies from civil law countries. They further find 
that the legal origin is a stronger explanator of the cross-country variation in CSR than 
previously proposed firm or country factors such as ownership concentration, political 
institutions, and globalization. Attig, Boubakri, El Ghoul, and Guedhami (2016) find that for a 
large sample of firms from 44 countries, firm internationalization is positively related to their 
respective CSR ratings. Li, Fetscherin, Alon, Lattemann, and Yeh (2010) find that for the 105 
largest MNEs in Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), a country’s governance environment 
is the most important driving force behind CSR communication intensity.  
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All these studies have in common that they draw on institutional theory to explain cross-country 
CSR variation. According to Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright (2000), institutional theory has 
become the predominant theory for analysing management decisions in emerging markets. 
Therefore, I review the literature on institutions in emerging markets next, to examine whether 
there are common institutional features that characterise and distinguish global emerging 
markets from global developed markets. Specifically, I provide theoretic rationale to conduct 
CSR studies for global emerging markets as a group. 
 
2.3.2 Institutional context and commonalities in emerging markets 
Institutions, or specialized intermediaries in an economy emerge in response to mitigate the 
various transaction costs associated with market failures in the economic exchange process 
arising from negotiating, monitoring, and enforcement costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 
1985; Jones and Hill, 1988). These institutions shape the general business environment such as 
political, economic, social, legal, and technological conditions and support the effective 
functioning of the market by allowing firms and individuals to trade without incurring undue 
costs or risks which in turn determine the outcomes and effectiveness of organizations (Meyer 
et al., 2009).  
Formal institutions comprise the functioning of capital markets and the enforcement of laws, 
and regulations regarding e.g. accounting requirements, information disclosure, and securities 
trading. Informal institutions comprise relational ties, business groups, family connections and 
government contacts (Young et al., 2008). According to leading scholars (e.g. North, 1990, 
1994; Peng and Heath, 1996; Meyer et al., 2009), emerging markets across the globe – while 
large cross-country differences exist – generally have less efficient formal institutions in 
promoting impersonal exchanges between economic actors, resulting in business being guided 
to a larger degree by informal institutions. This, in turn, has considerable consequences on the 
general business environment in these markets. In emerging markets, principal-principal (PP) 
conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are more important and 
pronounced rather than traditional principal-agent (PA) conflicts examined in most research 
dealing with developed markets (Young et al., 2008). Agents (top managers) are also (or 
represent) often the controlling shareholders via pyramid ownership structures and therewith 
can circumvent monitoring mechanisms such as the board of directors (Dharwadkar, George, 
and Brandes, 2000).  
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These PP conflicts manifest themselves via concentrated firm ownership through families or 
the state, and often result in weak governance indicators such as fewer publicly traded firms 
(La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999), lower firm valuations (Claessens, Djankov, 
Fan, and Lang, 2002), inefficient strategy (Filatotchev, Wright, Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, and 
Hoskisson, 2003), less information contained in stock prices (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000), 
less investment in innovation (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005). Most importantly, they 
ultimately increase the risk of expropriation of minority shareholders (e.g. Claessens et al., 
2000; Faccio et al., 2001). Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) find that even firms 
with good reputation exploited minority shareholders during the Asian financial crisis during 
the late 1990s. In this environment, it is more difficult to specify and measure the terms of 
contracts as formal institutional structures are ambiguous, so transaction costs in economic 
exchanges across global emerging markets are higher (Peng, 2003). 
 
2.3.3 Strategic responses of emerging market firms to overcome institutional voids 
Khanna and Palepu (1997, 2011) argue that as in emerging markets institutions like efficient 
capital markets, regulatory systems, and contract enforcement mechanisms are weak, firms 
must develop strategic responses to overcome these voids. In this context, Young et al. (2008) 
posit that if emerging market companies seek access to minority capital they will have to incur 
bonding costs as a type of implicit guarantee against expropriation of minority shareholders. 
These strategic responses to bond with minority shareholders span over building a reputation 
of treating minority shareholders fairly (Gomes, 2000), strategic alliances with foreign 
multinationals from countries with strong institutions (Siegel, 2009), geographical clustering to 
create local business environments (Karna et al., 2013), expanding the business abroad to access 
more efficient and munificent foreign markets (Luo and Tung, 2007), or signalling commitment 
to fair practices by voluntary cross-listings on exchanges with strong monitoring standards 
(Young et al., 2008). 
The very recent study of El Ghoul et al. (2017) is the first to test whether CSR might be another 
type of strategic response to overcome the transaction costs associated with institutional voids. 
They claim that CSR initiatives help reduce transaction cost and improve access to resources, 
which creates firm value. They find supportive evidence across 53 countries during 2003-2010 
that CSR is more positively related to firm value in countries with weaker market institutions. 
Specifically, they find that CSR is adding value by being associated with improved access to 
financing in countries with weaker equity and credit markets, greater investment and lower 
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default risk in countries with more limited business freedom, and longer trade credit period and 
higher future sales growth in countries with weaker legal institutions. Linking this finding to 
the fact that global emerging markets as a group generally have weaker formal market-
supporting institutions, there seems to be an increased incentive for firms in emerging markets 
to engage in CSR. 
 
2.3.4 Societal and organizational trends driving CSR sensitivity across global emerging 
markets 
For the channels between CSP and CFP to work, it is essential that the societies in emerging 
markets care about and value CSR commitments. While initial studies argue that stakeholders 
are less CSR sensitive in emerging markets or do not have the luxury to engage in CSR (e.g. 
Baughn et al., 2007), I find several societal and organizational trends that mitigate the reasons 
brought forward in these studies and are likely to further increase conduct and awareness of 
CSR activities in emerging markets. 
First, Western multinational enterprises (MNEs) increasingly focus on outsourcing production 
units and expanding sales to emerging markets as a source of future growth and increased 
profitability (e.g. Lacy and Hayward, 2011). Due to this increased internationalization of  
supply chains, issues in health and product safety of products produced in emerging markets, 
such as the milk and toy scandals in China, affect MNEs directly as their stakeholders demand 
responsibility along the whole supply chain (e.g. Bogdanich, 2008). Utz (2017) for example 
argues that globalization forces firms from Asia-Pacific to overinvest in CSR to adapt to 
Western standards. Perez-Batres et al. (2010) find that companies of countries in Latin America 
that have close business ties with European countries face more pressure on CSR issues and 
thus increasingly engage in CSR activities. 
Second, multinational enterprises from emerging markets (EM MNEs) increasingly emerged, 
such as Embraer of Brazil, Tata of India, and Alibaba and Haier (both of China). Attig et al. 
(2016) find that firm internationalization is positively related to firm’s CSR performance. As 
these firms enter other emerging and developed markets, they gain considerable world-wide 
attention and their activities are thus in the spotlight of investors, academics, governments, other 
concerned group and individuals. Therefore, they are likely fall under the same scrutiny 
regarding CSR as the traditional Western MNEs, as they face heightened awareness of these 
stakeholders about pollution, product quality, and safety affecting the world at large 
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(Bogdanich, 2008) and are likely to further drive the convergence of CSR awareness in 
emerging markets to Western standards (e.g. Doh, Littell and Quigley, 2015). 
Third, Western SRI investors with large capital accumulations in continuously low-interest 
environments amongst developed markets are searching for yield. At the same time, emerging 
markets have been increasingly recognized as the main factor for international diversification 
gains in portfolios of these investors (e.g. Goetzmann, Li, and Rowenhorst, 2005). According 
to a study of the McKinsey Global Institute (2010), the demand for capital across emerging 
markets is expected to keep surging for the foreseeable future. Emerging market companies 
thus have an incentive to increase their CSR performance to pass ESG screenings to access 
these capital pools via equity financing to drive their desired growth.  
Fourth, strong CSR awareness of managers of emerging market firms as well as growing 
education levels and middle classes facilitate CSR sensitivity in these markets. Besides, Arya 
and Zhang (2009) state that social and environmental crises are usually most acutely felt in 
emerging countries. Lacy and Hayward (2011) conduct a CEO study on the topic of 
sustainability in partnership with United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) and Accenture. The 
study is based on a survey of 766 UNGC CEOs, in-depth interviews with an additional 50 
member CEOs and further interviews with more than 50 business and civil society leaders. 
They find that a total of 93 percent of CEOs see sustainability as important to their company’s 
future success. Furthermore, this figure is even higher in emerging markets, at 98 percent. They 
recognize that it is contestable if this survey alone represents a genuine shift towards a new 
approach to sustainability. However, they claim that among leading emerging market 
companies, momentum seems to be building both in words and in actions.  
 
2.4 The CSP and CFP debate in the institutional context of emerging markets 
2.4.1 The effect of CSR on firm value across global emerging markets 
In summary, institutional theory suggests that – even though cross-country differences exist 
between them – global emerging markets as a group are typically characterised by weaker 
institutions and therewith economic exchanges endure higher transaction costs. These 
institutional voids shape the business environment and often induce PP conflicts via extensive 
family ownership and control, business group structures, and weak legal protection of minority 
shareholders and ultimately increase the risk of expropriation for minority shareholders. To 
overcome these voids and reduce undue transaction costs, firms must develop strategic 
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responses that alleviate these concerns of investors. El Ghoul et al. (2017) show that superior 
CSP reduces transaction costs and improves access to resources for companies in countries with 
weak institutions, which is reflected in higher firm values. Furthermore, societal and 
organizational trends emphasize the increase in CSR sensitivity of stakeholders and managers 
of emerging market firms. Following this logic, recent research strongly points towards a 
positive relationship between CSP and firm value across global emerging markets. 
H1: CSR performance is positively related to firm value across global emerging markets 
While the theoretical rationale to conduct CSR studies across global emerging markets is 
straightforward, there is no previous study examining this link treating global emerging market 
companies as a group. This is probably due to the neglection to recognize institutional 
commonalities across global emerging market companies, the ESG data scarcity in emerging 
markets and the extremely volatile capital markets in the last decade steering the focus on risk 
characteristics. This thesis closes this research gap. 
 
2.4.2 The role of firm-level governance in emerging markets 
As institutional theory suggests, emerging market companies often lack effective market 
supporting institutions, and thus suffer from a weak macro governance environment overseeing 
economic transactions. Therefore, the importance investors place on efficient internal corporate 
governance is especially high in emerging markets (Ding et al., 2010). Theoretically, this 
suggests that firms with higher governance rating performance enjoy higher firm valuations. In 
a similar study for a sample of U.S. firms, Kim et al. (2014) find that the mitigating effect of 
CSR on stock price crash risk is especially pronounced when the firm-level governance rating 
performance is low.   
However, there is a problem arising from institutional differences between developed markets 
and emerging markets. This is because the predominant model of corporate governance is a 
product of developed economies, where ownership and control are often separated, and legal 
mechanisms protect owners’ interests. That is why most attention when evaluating a firm’s 
governance practices is placed on PA conflicts between owners and managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). However, the traditional focus on PA conflicts does not apply to emerging 
economies, where PP conflicts dominate the governance environment (Young et al., 2008). For 
example, in developed economies concentrated ownership is widely promoted as a possible 
means of addressing PA conflicts (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In emerging economies, however, 
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since concentrated ownership is the root cause of PP conflicts, increasing ownership 
concentration even further often make things worse (Faccio et al., 2001). 
Thomson Reuters – like other ESG rating agencies – has a standard criteria list used for all 
companies which they evaluate. The governance pillar consists of three categories, i.e. 
management, shareholders, and CSR strategy. In this context, CSR strategy refers to the 
establishment of a sustainability committee, voluntarily disclosures, audits etc. Criteria for the 
shareholder category are for example shareholder policy engagements and majority 
requirements for director elections. While a high performance in Thomson Reuters governance 
performance is in line with proper governance structures according to the developed markets 
governance model, it might be less so in the institutional context of emerging markets.  
Specifically, shareholders engaging in policy matters and having significant influence on the 
composition of the board of directors in developed countries with dispersed ownership will 
likely discipline managers. However, in emerging countries already dominant shareholders 
might use their engagement to steer business according to their personal interests and might put 
captured state officials or family members in the board of directors. This must not destroy value 
per se, as they could potentially better manage a company in the institutional context of 
emerging markets with institutional voids, but it could. Therefore, the effect of firm-level 
governance rating performance on firm value remains an empirical question and calls for a 
detailed inspection of all category scores. 
H2: Firm-level governance rating performance has a positive effect on firm value across global 
emerging markets 
While firm-level corporate governance constitutes an internal monitoring mechanism in the 
absence of market-supporting institutions in emerging markets, previous research has identified 
two key external monitoring mechanisms which also potentially reduce the risk of expropriation 
of minority shareholders, i.e. analyst coverage and institutional ownership.  
 
2.4.3 The role of sell-side analysts on CSR and firm value across global emerging markets 
According to Chung and Jo (1996), equity analysts act as an external monitor that help reduce 
agency costs, and as information intermediaries who steer investor attention towards important 
information. Yu (2008) claims that analyst coverage imposes discipline on misbehaving 
managers and helps align managers with the interests of shareholders. The primary role of 
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equity analysts concerning governance is to uncover any financial reporting irregularities rather 
than providing elaborate ESG information (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011). Consequently, firm 
value should increase in the number of financial analysts following the firm – next to CSR 
performance. However, in societies where economic exchanges are predominantly guided by 
informal institutions such as relational ties, business groups, family connections and 
government contacts (e.g. Young et al., 2008), analysing predominantly publicly available 
information might not yield superior intelligence. Chan and Hameed (2006) for example find 
that greater analyst coverage increases stock price synchronicity across global emerging 
markets. That means that the stocks of firms covered by more analysts have less firm-specific 
information content than the ones which are covered by less analysts. Therefore, whether 
analyst coverage has a positive effect (next to CSR performance) on firm value remains an 
empirical question. 
H3: Analyst coverage has a positive effect on firm value across global emerging markets 
Jo and Harjoto (2014) find for a sample of U.S. firms, that while analysts are primarily 
concerned with financial information, they provide indirect but additional social pressure on 
firms to reduce their irresponsible activities. Sell-side analysts work for brokerage firms and 
their trading recommendations serve as basis for decisions of a large pool of clients. As such, 
they work towards a reputation for accurate recommendations. In the emerging market context, 
that means that they would shy away from covering companies for which there are severe 
governance concerns resulting in high risk of expropriation of minority shareholder concerns – 
which are their clients. As such, analyst coverage could – just like superior CSP– signal trust 
to the marketplace that the covered company is well governed and bears little risk of minority 
shareholder expropriation and these companies should, in turn, enjoy higher valuations. 
Following this logic, both analysts as external monitors in economies with weak institutions 
and CSR as internal strategic response to overcome institutional voids could be partly 
substitutes for each other. In that case, analyst coverage would have a negative incremental 
effect on the hypothesized positive relation between CSR and firm value. 
At the same time, CSR activities – especially when intended to attract foreign capital – must be 
effectively communicated to become a source of competitive advantage (Chahal and Sharma, 
2006). As such, analysts could act as an amplifying voice in disseminating CSR commitments 
of emerging market companies and ESG rating agencies and equity analysts would be 
complementarians rather than competitors. Dimson et al. (2015) suggest that analyst coverage 
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intensifies reputational concerns along U.S. firms, which promotes the success of management 
change in cases where shareholders address environmental and social concerns. In these cases, 
analyst coverage would have a positive incremental effect on the hypothesized positive relation 
between CSR and firm value. Which effect prevails remains an empirical question. 
H4: Analyst coverage amplifies the positive effect of CSR on firm value across global emerging 
markets 
 
2.4.4 The role of institutional ownership in global emerging markets 
As elaborated on before, large (Western) institutional investors increasingly exercise their rights 
as business owners to influence the management of their portfolio companies to address ESG 
concerns. They do so by engaging with management via letters, emails, telephone 
conversations, personal meetings with senior management and voting at shareholders’ meetings 
on behalf of both their internal and external clients (Dimson et al., 2015). For a sample of U.S. 
public companies from 1999–2009, Dimson et al. (2015) find that successful (unsuccessful) 
ESG engagements are followed by positive (zero) abnormal returns. After successful 
engagements, companies experience improved accounting performance, governance and 
increased institutional ownership. They further find that companies with inferior corporate 
governance structures are more likely to be engaged by socially conscious institutional 
investors. 
Bae, Lim, and Wei (2006) argue that in companies with strong monitoring from boards or 
institutional investors, adverse effects attested by proponents of the negative view of CSR such 
as bad news hoarding might be limited. The investment horizon of the institutional investor is 
critical. Callen and Fang (2013) find that in the U.S., the presence of long-term institutional 
investors reduce crash risk by limiting managerial bad-news hoarding, but short-term 
institutional investors are more likely to cause crashes through frequent trading due to high 
sensitivity to bad news. Overall, the current research focussing on developed markets favours 
the view that the presence of large and long-term oriented investors is associated with better 
return and risk profiles of companies. There is reason to believe that the same mechanism is 
less effective across emerging market companies. Dimson et al. (2015) point out that 
collaboration among activists is instrumental in increasing the success rate of environmental 
and social engagements. First, large institution with fiduciary duty are unlikely to have offices 
in every single emerging market in which they invest and cultural differences might be large. 
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Second, emerging markets are characterised by a more informal business and governance 
environment. Powerful managing principals belonging to influential families or working for the 
state might be less likely to collaborate when being engaged. 
As such, it would be interesting to empirically test – just like for analyst coverage – if foreign 
long-term institutional shareholding is associated with higher subsequent firm valuation across 
global emerging markets and if and to which extent it is a substitute or complementary 
mechanism compared to CSR. Unfortunately, the data availability on institutional 
shareholdings accessible on Thomson Reuters EIKON is insufficient to construct a sample of 
significant size that establishes confidence in the statistical power of any empirical analysis. 
Therefore, I refrain from stating explicit hypotheses regarding the role of foreign institutional 
shareholdings in global emerging markets, but I encourage further researchers to address this 
issue. 
Figure 1 below provides an overview of the different relationships presented in this thesis and 
my hypothesized interrelations of those. 
 
Figure 1: Model of Relationships 
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3. Research Design 
 
The research design chapter introduces the statistical set up of the empirical analysis conducted 
and is structured as follows. First, a detailed overview of how the sample has been constructed 
is given. Specifically, it elaborates on the sources of the raw data for dependent, independent, 
and control variables with their necessary exclusions, and the construction of the proxies for 
CSR performance and firm value. Second, it introduces the methodological set up of the 
unbalanced panel data analysis by elaborating on econometric frameworks and the specification 
used for the data at hand.  
 
3.1 Sample construction 
3.1.1 The sample 
The raw data on ESG scorings, firm value, and control variables have been retrieved from 
Thomson Reuters EIKON in July 2018. The creation of a global sample of companies across 
emerging markets, a main distinctive aspect of my thesis, requires restructuring of the raw data. 
Specifically, Thomson Reuters EIKON provides ESG, market and fundamental data per 
financial year. However, closer examination reveals that these financial years differ between 
companies in terms of reporting date within a year and in terms of data availability. This means 
for example that the total value of common book equity of company x for the past 5 years spans 
over the time horizon of 2012-2016 and it reports on June 30 of each year, while the total value 
of common book equity of company y for the past 5 years spans over the time horizon of 2013-
2017 and it reports on December 31 of each year. Consequently, the raw data had to be 
restructured, so that the financial years are consistent across all companies. 
Table 1 below shows an overview over the sample selection process. The starting point is the 
Thomson Reuters Global Emerging Market index, which consists of 3091 companies, whose 
headquarters are based in countries defined as emerging markets by Thomson Reuters. Of these 
3091 companies, only around a third (950) has received an ESG rating at least once in the period 
of 2010-2016. Furthermore, I exclude 13 company duplicates. There is no determining rule but 
considerable controversy regarding how to classify countries as emerging. In the academic 
context, an often-used benchmark when talking about emerging markets is the MSCI EM Index. 
Therefore, I decide to follow this index classification scheme (Appendix A) and exclude another 
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53 companies whose headquarters are based in countries which this benchmark index does not 
classify as emerging markets.  
 
Table 1: Construction of the unbalanced data panel  
In panel a of this table, the sample selection process is described. The raw data sourced from Thomson Reuters 
EIKON comprise 3091 companies comprised in the Thomson Reuters Global Emerging Market Index. 657 
companies, for which at least in one financial year between 2010 and 2016 full data is available, are identified and 
included in the sample. The criteria in the first column involve Return on Assets (ROA), which is calculated as 
Net income before extraordinary items𝑖,𝑌
Total Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌−1
, SIZE, calculated as 𝑙𝑛 (𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌) and Tobin’s q (TOBQ), 
which is calculated as 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑌+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌−𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑌
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌
. Panel b illustrates the 
number of firm-year observations available per financial year. As this number varies over the sample period 2010-
2016, this data panel is called unbalanced. 
 
 
Panel A: Overview of the unbalanced panel data sample construction  
Data source/operations conducted # Companies left # Exclusions 
TR Global Emerging Market Index 3091  
TR Global Emerging Markets index with at least one ESG 
scoring 
950 2141 
Excluding duplicates 937 13 
Excluding non-MSCI EM defined countries 884 53 
Excluding negative Book value of Equity 867 17 
Trim SIZE and ROA at top and bottom percent 835 32 
Excluding TOBQ >8 outliers 825 10 
Excluding financial sector companies 657 168 
Panel B: Number of final firm-year observations per financial year 
Financial Year # Companies included in the sample 
2010  424 
2011 470 
2012 517 
2013 551 
2014 595 
2015 618 
2016 625 
TOTAL 3800 
 
Furthermore, I exclude 17 firms with negative book values of equity as they are subject to 
different bankruptcy laws and might distort the results. Histograms reveal that there several 
extreme values in size and return on assets (ROA) in the 867 companies left, so I further trim 
the data along these two dimensions at the bottom and top percentile. They further reveal that 
there are several extreme positive outliers in Tobin’s q (TOBQ), so I delete another 10 
companies which have a value higher than 8. Finally, in line with previous research (e.g. Kim 
et al., 2014), I exclude 168 of the remaining companies which are classified as either banks or 
insurances according to the global industry classification standards (GICS) developed by MSCI 
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and Standard & Poor's. Financial institutions are often subject to different reporting standards 
and might distort the results when included. The final sample consists of 657 firms. The 
increasing data availability of emerging market companies becomes evident in panel b of Table 
1, which shows that the number of firm year observations per financial year is strictly increasing 
in time. The number of firm-year observations across all years amounts to 3800. 
 
Table 2 below shows a more detailed overview over the sampling distribution by country, MSCI 
EM region and GICS industry group. The distribution by country ranges from merely one 
company in the Czech Republic to 100 companies in Taiwan. Generally, data availability seems 
to be most extensive in Asian countries and least extensive in countries of the Middle East and 
Eastern Europe. This can be further seen in the sample distribution by MSCI region. Companies 
clustered into the emerging market region Asia represent nearly 60% of the sample, while the 
other two regions EMEA and Americas only represent around 20% each. However, there is no 
reason to be concerned about systematic sampling bias. The latest MSCI EM index fact sheet 
of August 2018 reveals that China, Taiwan, and India make up over 50% of the index, while 
these three countries together amount to less than 40% in my sample. Instead of sample bias, 
there is simply a dominance of Asian economies that are emerging. Furthermore, there are over 
one hundred companies in each region, so the sample is well diversified. Panel c shows the 
distribution by the remaining 22 GICS industry groups, after banks and insurances have been 
excluded. While commercial & professional services and diversified financial (0.30% and 
0.61%, respectively) are underrepresented, materials and capital goods (15.22% and 10.35%, 
respectively) are slightly overrepresented.  
This is no surprise, given that the two usually large tertiary industry sectors banks and 
insurances have been excluded and the primary and secondary economic sectors in emerging 
economies are typically larger compared to developed economies. Moreover, the shares of the 
remaining industry groups are reasonably close to each other, so that this dimension of the 
sample does also not raise serious concerns about any systematic sample bias. 
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Table 2: Sample distribution by country, region, and industry group 
This table shows the sample distribution of 657 individual companies retrieved from Thomson Reuters EIKON 
that are in countries defined as emerging markets according to the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
Emerging Market (EM) Index classification during 2010-2016. Panel a shows the number and percentage of the 
657 companies belonging to each of the 20 different emerging markets of this sample. Panel b shows the number 
and percentage of the 657 companies belonging to each of the three regions in which the MSCI EM index is 
divided. Panel c shows the number and percentage of the 657 companies belonging to each of the remaining 22 
global industry classification standards (GICS) industry groups developed by MSCI and Standard & Poor's, after 
the two industry groups industries banks and insurances have been excluded due to regulatory reporting 
differences. 
 
      
Panel A: By Country Panel C: By GICS Industry Group 
Country N % GICS Industry Group N % 
South Africa 75 11.42% Materials 100 15.22% 
Malaysia 38 5.78% Food, Beverage & Tobacco 46 7.00% 
Hong Kong 30 4.57% Capital Goods 68 10.35% 
Taiwan 100 15.22% Food & Staples Retailing 17 2.59% 
Thailand 30 4.57% Real Estate 49 7.46% 
Philippines 22 3.35% Energy 47 7.15% 
Indonesia 29 4.41% Utilities 61 9.28% 
India 71 10.81% Technology Hardware & Equipment 38 5.78% 
Czech Republic 1 0.15% Automobiles & Components 24 3.65% 
Russia 25 3.81% Pharma, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 17 2.59% 
Turkey 18 2.74% Retailing 19 2.89% 
Hungary 3 0.46% Transportation 46 7.00% 
Brazil 56 8.52% Semiconductors & Equipment 13 1.98% 
China 62 13.44% Telecommunication Services 41 6.24% 
Mexico 31 4.72% Consumer Services 14 2.13% 
Egypt 5 0.76% Commercial & Prof. Services 2 0.30% 
Chile 31 4.72% Household & Personal Products 5 0.76% 
UA Emirates 6 0.91% Consumer Durables & Apparel 18 2.74% 
Qatar 7 1.07% Diversified Financials 4 0.61% 
Poland 17 2.59% Media 10 1.52% 
TOTAL 657 100% Health Care Equipment & Services 10 1.52% 
Panel B: By MSCI EM Region Software & Services 8 1.22% 
MSCI EM Region N % TOTAL 657 100% 
Asia 382 58.14%    
EMEA 157 23.90%    
Americas 118 17.96%    
TOTAL 657 100%    
 
3.1.2 Measuring CSR performance 
For international CSR studies and especially studies examining CSR in emerging markets, the 
preferred database for ESG data is Thomson Reuters EIKON, as it is one of the most 
comprehensive ESG databases in the industry covering over 7,000 public companies globally, 
across more than 400 different ESG metrics, increasingly enhancing the coverage of emerging 
market companies since 2010 (Halbritter and Dorfleitner, 2015; Thomson Reuters, 2018). 
Following these studies and given that this thesis is conducted across global emerging markets, 
I rely on these Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG scores in the statistical analysis. These scores 
are updated financial yearly and even include firms after bankruptcy, a merger, and other causes 
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of delisting. Thus, the data set is free from survivorship bias (Utz, 2017). They span over ten 
category scores, which are combined into three pillars: environmental, social, and governance. 
These are further aggregated into an ESG score and any controversies across these categories 
are captured in a separate ESG controversies score. The ESG score is eventually combined with 
the ESG controversies score to yield the ESG combined score. All scores range from 0-100 and 
are assessed relative to their industry peers. A detailed overview of the methodology of the 
Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG ratings can be found in Appendix B. 
In line with the rationale to conceptually differentiate between ESG and CSR above, authors of 
recent studies on CSR in international or emerging market settings across top rated journals 
refer to the common practice of using the equally-weighted average of the environmental and 
social pillar scores as proxy for CSR performance (e.g. Kim et al., 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2017, 
Utz, 2017). Following their logic, I define CSR performance 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑌 of firm i in financial year 
Y as: 
 
(1) 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑌 =  
𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌 + 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌
2
 
 
However, this approach is subject to debate. The governance scores are composed of the 
management, shareholders, and CSR strategy categories. However, CSR activity is exactly 
what researchers are intending to proxy by the combination of the environmental and social 
pillars. In line with this criticism, Utz (2017) and Attig et al. (2013) observe that the significance 
of pillar scores in their analyses is driven by just a few categories and that some categories in 
the same pillars have contradicting effects and might therefore mask statistically consistent 
results at pillar level. Therefore, I conduct an additional analysis where I inspect the effect of 
the individual ESG category scores on firm value. 
 
3.1.3 Measuring firm value 
A common proxy used for firm value is Tobin’s q ratio (e.g. Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk 
and Cohen, 2005; Cremers and Nair, 2005). As CSR can translate into superior firm 
performance through various channels effecting return and risk dimensions, I use Tobin’s q as 
firm value proxy for financial performance, as it captures all these channels in aggregate (El 
Ghoul et al., 2017). Tobin’s q (TOBQ) is defined as the market value of the firm’s assets divided 
by the replacement value of the firm’s assets and indicates by how much more (less) the market 
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values the company’s assets above (below) the mere book value of the assets the firm owns. In 
line with El Ghoul et al. (2017), I compute  𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑌 for firm i in financial year Y as follows: 
 
(2) 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑌 =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑌 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌 − 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑌
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌
 
 
Using TOBQ as dependent variable rather than stock returns has the advantage that within the 
Thomson Reuters EIKON database, market capitalization and accounting data are both 
measured on the reporting date of each company and thus automatically match. Proxies 
involving stock return data would necessitate the matching of trading days to the individual 
financial reporting dates of each company and to guarantee comparability, trading days between 
companies that are listed on different exchanges would have to be matched. Moreover, 
Thomson Reuters does not report the dates at which they publish their ESG ratings. This results 
in a timing problem regarding stock return and CSR performance. 
 
3.1.4 Control variables 
I follow the previously introduced studies of Gompers et al. (2013) and El Ghoul et al. (2017), 
which have identified a variety of control variables expected to significantly influence TOBQ 
beyond CSR. (1) Firms that are more profitable have more scope to pay dividends, invest in 
necessary R&D or other projects and to sustain adverse market events and are thus expected to 
have higher firm values. I define 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑌 as net income before extraordinary items during 
financial year Y scaled by previous financial year’s total book value of assets. (2) Larger firms 
are already established and are associated with lower TOBQ because these firms tend to have 
more limited growth opportunities. I define 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑌 as the logarithm of total book value of 
assets at the end of the financial year. (3) Firms with higher leverage are expected to be more 
sensitive to market shocks and to have less flexibility in making investment decisions due to 
for example constraining debt covenants, resulting in lower TOBQ. I define 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑌 as total book 
value of debt at the end of the financial year over total book value of assets at the end of the 
same financial year. 
(4) In developed markets and international studies, economic development has been found to 
be positively related to TOBQ (e.g. El Ghoul et al., 2017). The rationale is that economic 
development is associated with better institutions like equity and debt markets and legal 
protection, which results in higher valuations. On the other hand, countries with higher 
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economic development often yield less growth opportunities as these markets are typically more 
saturated. In a purely emerging market companies sample like in this study, the effect remains 
to be seen. I define 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑌 as the logarithm of GDP per capita each year at constant 2000 USD, 
which I retrieved from the publicly available World Bank database. (5) In the institutional 
environment of emerging markets, firms that have had more time to establish trust among 
minority shareholders are likely to be able to attract more local and foreign capital. Therefore, 
firm age is expected to be positively related to TOBQ. I follow Gompers et al. (2003) in defining 
𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑌 as the logarithm of firm age at the end of the financial year. An overview of all variables 
with precise Thomson Reuters definitions can be found in Appendix C. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Panel data analysis 
The key feature of a data panel set is that it contains observations of individuals across both, 
the cross-sectional and the time-series (longitudinal) dimensions. Therefore, panel data 
regressions differ from a regular time-series or cross-section regressions in that the variables 
have double subscripts. In its simplest form, the baseline regression inspected looks as follows: 
 
(3) 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑌+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑌 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑌+𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑌 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑌  
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑌 +  𝛽4 ∗ 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑌 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑌 
Where i denotes the individual firms (cross-section component) and Y denotes the different 
financial years (time-series component) for which these individual firm observations are 
collected. This baseline regression tests the effect of CSR performance on one-year ahead firm 
valuation proxied by TOBQ while controlling for fundamental variables explained above. In 
line with El Ghoul et al. (2017), I use lagged CSR and fundamental data to mitigate concerns 
about reverse causality and simultaneity. The cross-sectional observations are the 657 
individual companies. The time-series observations are regularly spaced over a period of seven 
individual financial years, i.e. 2010-2016 for the independent variables and 2011-2017 for the 
dependent variable.  
Data panels can be either balanced or unbalanced. A balanced panel sample in this context 
would mean that I only include companies in the sample that have full availability of data across 
the entire time horizon of 2010-2016 for independent variables and equivalently 2011-2017 for 
the dependent variable. An unbalanced panel data includes firms for which all variables are 
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available in one year, independent of whether they are available in any of the other years. The 
main advantage of a balanced data panel is the statistical ease of analysing it with standard 
statistical software. The disadvantage is that it necessitates the exclusion of a relatively large 
amount of observations. Compared to similar studies, the sample size of 3080 firm-year 
observations is on the lower end, so excluding even more observations is not desirable. More 
importantly, only analysing companies with a complete history of data may inflict attrition bias 
on the analysis, which relates to systematic non-response or dropping of observations which 
inflict the statistical validity of the analysis (Baltagi, 2005). Specifically, there might be an 
underlying reason why companies have full histories of ESG data, and only including those 
companies might influence the outcome of the empirical analysis leading to falsely generalising 
results only applying to this specific type of companies. For these reasons, I rely on an 
unbalanced panel data regression analysis. The next section elaborates on the exact model 
specification used. 
 
3.2.2 Fixed effects OLS model 
There are three different kinds of OLS panel data regression models which one needs to estimate 
to subsequently select the most appropriate one. The pooled regression model pools all 3010 
firm-year observations together, combining all 657 companies and therewith neglecting the 
cross section and time series nature of the data. The fixed effects model allows for heterogeneity 
or individuality among the cross-sections, periods or both by allowing them to have individual 
time-invariant and/or period individual-invariant intercepts and error terms. The random effects 
model maintains the cross-section and time series nature of the data model, but instead of 
systematic individuality among these dimensions, it imposes a common mean value for the 
intercept across all cross-sections and/or periods (Baltagi, 2005). 
I run a pooled panel regression as a basis to conduct the Breusch and Pagan (1979) test for 
heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation. Its null hypothesis is that there is no 
heteroskedasticity along both dimensions, cross-sections and periods. For both dimensions, this 
is clearly rejected, providing evidence of heteroskedasticity along both dimensions at the 1% 
level (Appendix D). This first attempt suggests a two-way error component unbalanced OLS 
regression model as proposed by El Ghoul et al. (2017) with fixed effects for cross-sections and 
periods, which looks as follows: 
 
 
35 
 
(4) 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑌+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑌 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑌+𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑌 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑌  
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑌 +  𝛽4 ∗ 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑌 + 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 +  𝑢𝑖,𝑌 
Where 𝐹𝐼𝑋𝐸𝐷 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑆 represent dummy variables for companies and years and the model 
contains two-way error component disturbances: 
𝑢𝑖,𝑌 = 𝜇𝑖,𝑌 + 𝜆𝑖,𝑌 + 𝜗𝑖,𝑌  
 
The model error term 𝑢𝑖,𝑌 is composed of 𝜇𝑖,𝑌, which denotes the time-invariant unobservable 
cross-sectional individual effect, λt denotes the individual-invariant unobservable time-series 
effect and 𝜗𝑖,𝑌 is the remainder stochastic disturbance term. The critical assumption for this 
two-way fixed effects error component model with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators to 
produce consistent estimators is that the remainder stochastic error term is normally distributed 
with constant variance, i.e. 𝜗𝑖,𝑌 ∼IID(0,𝜎𝜗
2). If the unobserved heterogeneity contained in the 
remainder stochastic error is correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables, OLS 
parameter estimates are biased and inconsistent (Baltagi, 2005). 
 
3.2.3 Generalized least square regression (EGLS) 
I conduct a White (1980) test for heteroskedasticity, i.e. I regress the remainder residuals of the 
fixed effects model against the squared regressors. The joint significance of the explanatories 
is given by the reported F-statistic of 84.621 with a corresponding p-value of 0.000 (Appendix 
E). Consequently, the hypothesis that the explanatories are insignificant is rejected, so the OLS 
fixed effects model suffers from heterogeneity in the remainder error term. Furthermore, a 
Jarque-Bera test for normality of the standardized remainder disturbances yields a test statistic 
of 7509 and is rejected at the 1% level (Appendix E). Consequently, OLS estimates are 
inconsistent for our data and it is necessary to switch to a generalized least squares (GLS) model 
(Baltagi, 2005). 
I repeat the White test separately for cross-sectional fixed effects and period fixed effects and 
find that the heteroskedasticity stems almost exclusively from the cross-section error terms. 
Therefore, I specify an estimated generalized least square regression (EGLS) with cross-section 
weights, as it relaxes the assumption of homoskedasticity in the cross-sections but copes with 
the heteroskedasticity through a cross-sectionally weighted error term, as first suggested by 
Mazodier and Trognon (1978). With this model specification, the heteroskedasticity problem 
is eliminated, as the subsequent White test in Appendix F shows. Furthermore, this EGLS 
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model reveals that the standard errors of the estimators are smaller, which provides additional 
evidence that for the dataset GLS is more efficient than OLS. For the research setting at hand, 
this pooled GLS model specification also has a conceptual advantage over the fixed effects 
methodology applied by El Ghoul et al. (2017). While they specify numerous institutional 
variables to trace out specific institutional country-level determinants that effect the relationship 
between CSR and firm valuation, the crucial point of my analysis is the assumption that global 
emerging markets as a pooled group are determined by weak institutions. 
By selecting cross-section weights in the EViews mask, the software automatically estimates a 
feasible GLS specification correcting for the presence of cross-section heteroskedasticity. 
Moreover, I report corresponding robust standard errors adjusted for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the cross-sections. The final model looks as follows: 
 
(5) 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑌+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑌 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑌 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑌 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑌  
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑌 +  𝛽4 ∗ 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑌 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑌 
with cross-sectionally weighted error disturbances: 
𝛾𝑖,𝑌 = 𝑤𝑖,𝑌 ∗ 𝜇𝑖,𝑌 + 𝜗𝑖,𝑌  
where 𝑤𝑖,𝑌 represents the weight placed on each cross-section residual when minimizing the 
overall sum of squared residuals of the overall GLS model.  
To test for regional differences in this relationship, I iteratively run this baseline regression 
including the respective interaction terms CSR*Asia, CSR*EMEA, and CSR*Americas. To 
test the effect of firm-level governance and ESG ratings on pillar and category level on firm 
value across emerging markets, I adjust the independent variables of baseline regression (5) 
accordingly. Specifically, I substitute the CSR proxy for (1) the ESG combined score, (2) the 
three pillar scores (3) the governmental pillar score separately, (4) the governmental pillar 
category scores: Management, Shareholders, and CSR Strategy, (5) and all 10 category scores: 
Resource Use, Emissions, Environmental Innovation, Workforce, Human Rights, Community, 
Product Responsibility, Management, Shareholders, CSR Strategy. The methodology, 
however, does not change. The same holds true for the analysis of the effect of analyst coverage 
on the relationship of CSR and firm value. Specifically, I add 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑌 as defined before to 
baseline regression model (5). Furthermore, I add the interaction term 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑌*𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑌 to inspect 
whether and to which extent ESG rating providers and analysts are complementarians or 
substitutes. As the number of analysts is only available for slightly less companies, the analysis 
on the role of analysts is conducted on a reduced sample with 3,504 firm-year observations.   
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4. Results 
 
This chapter provides an objective analysis of the descriptive and inferential statistics produced 
by the empirical analysis and is structured as follows. First, descriptive statistics for the full 
sample and by country and region are presented. Second, the results of the inferential statistics 
regarding the main analysis of the effect of CSR on firm value and the additional analyses 
regarding the role of firm-level governance and sell-side analysts are presented. The description 
of the statistical results provides the basis for a subjective interpretation of them in the context 
of the introduced literature, which follows in the fifth chapter. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 below shows the descriptive statistics of the unbalanced data panel. Even though I 
excluded 10 outliers with values for TOBQ above 8, the dispersion in firm value is considerable. 
In the international sample of 2445 firms from 53 countries over the period 2003-2010 across 
both developed and emerging markets of El Ghoul et al. (2017), the mean value of TOBQ is 
1.76 with a standard deviation of 0.99. In my sample, consisting of companies exclusively from 
emerging markets, the mean value of TOBQ is slightly lower with 1.661 and the standard 
deviation slightly higher with 1.080. Their sample yields an average value of CSR of 52.72 with 
a standard deviation of 28.89. In my sample, the average value of CSR is slightly lower with 
46.794 and the standard is notably lower with 20.898. Even though the sample periods differ, 
and the samples span over different geographies, the values are relatively similar. The signs and 
magnitudes of the control variables are also in line with previous research.  
Firm size is measured as the logarithm of total book value of assets and transformation to 
naturals numbers shows that it varies from around USD 140mn to around USD 410bn with a 
mean and median value of around USD 5.3bn. This indicates that there are rather large 
companies included in the final sample, which is probably caused by the fact that Thomson 
Reuter covers rather large companies about which there is enough public information available 
to arrive at accurate rating results. Moreover, the demand for ESG data of clients is likely to be 
larger for large, publicly traded companies. As such, this constitutes a potential limitation in the 
way that the obtained results and conclusions might exclusively apply to relatively large firms.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the full and reduced sample 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample of 657 individual emerging market firms with 3,800 
firm-year observations included in the baseline unbalanced data panel as well as for the reduced sample of 3,504 
firm-year observations used for the additional analysis of the role of analysts (last row). One-year ahead Tobin’s 
q (TOBQ) is measured for the financial reporting years from 2011-2017 and is defined as 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑌+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌−𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑌
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌
. All other variables are constructed with financial 
yearly data ranging from 2010-2016. The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) proxy is constructed from 
Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG scores and defined as 
𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌+𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌
2
. Return on 
Assets (ROA) is defined as 
Net income before extraordinary items𝑖,𝑌
Total Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌−1
. Leverage (LEV) is defined as 
Total Reported Value of Debt𝑖,𝑌
Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌
. SIZE is defined as the logarithm of 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌. GDP is defined as the 
logarithm of  GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD𝑖,𝑌. Age is defined as the logarithm of current Year 𝑌𝑖 −
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 . For the additional analysis of firm-level governance, the Thomson Reuters ESG 
combined score, the three pillar level scores: Environmental, Social, and Governance as well as the ten category 
level scores: Resource Use, Emissions, Environmental Innovation, Workforce, Human Rights, Community, 
Product Responsibility, Management, Shareholders, and CSR Strategy, are included. All scores range from 0-100 
and are assessed relative to their industry peers. A detailed overview of the methodology of the Thomson Reuters 
EIKON ESG ratings can be found in Appendix B. For the additional analysis of analyst coverage, ANA is defined 
as the logarithm of the 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌  that are covering the stock of 
the company. The raw data have been retrieved for companies in the Thomson Reuters EIKON Global Emerging 
Market Index which have their headquarters based in a country defined as emerging market by the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market (EM) Index classification. Next to firms with insufficient data 
availability, firms with negative Book value of Equity, TOBQ >8, and financial sector firms (GICS: Banks and 
Insurances) have been excluded. The sample is further trimmed at the top and bottom percent across SIZE and 
ROA. 
 
         
Variable N Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max SD 
Dependent Variable 
TOBQ 3800 1.661 0.323 1.019 1.273 1.887 7.889 1.080 
Independent Variable 
CSR (raw) 3800 46.794 5.241 28.696 47.033 63.471 94.928 20.898 
CRS (normalised) 3800 0.463 0 0.262 0.466 0.649 1 0.233 
Control Variables 
ROA 3800 0.068 -0.317 0.027 0.054 0.096 0.880 0.073 
LEV 3800 0.272 0.000 0.149 0.271 0.374 0.811 0.160 
SIZE 3800 22.394 18.755 21.548 22.396 23.229 26.736 1.226 
GDP 3800 9.081 7.205 8.652 9.208 9.609 11.194 0.861 
AGE 3800 3.537 0.693 3.091 3.497 3.970 5.176 0.571 
Additional analysis: Firm-level governance  
ESG combined score 3800 44.271 6.133 31.107 42.702 56.941 92.313 17.043 
Environmental Pillar (E) 3800 46.221 2.600 27.568 45.562 63.706 98.462 22.286 
Social Pillar (S) 3800 47.368 3.413 27.439 47.922 65.714 96.674 22.776 
Governance Pillar (G) 3800 49.567 2.605 32.998 49.200 65.942 97.506 21.054 
G (normalized) 3800 0.495 0 0.320 0.491 0.667 1 0.222 
Resource Use 3800 46.576 0.167 23.333 45.565 67.724 99.838 26.473 
Emissions 3800 45.931 0.168 21.077 45.326 69.048 99.775 28.378 
Environmental Innovation 3800 46.180 0.177 25.294 41.100 67.373 99.819 26.543 
Workforce 3800 51.426 0.162 26.744 52.705 76.173 99.775 28.633 
Human Rights 3800 47.723 7.692 26.800 34.574 71.104 99.746 25.980 
Community 3800 39.578 0.162 14.085 32.438 64.073 99.825 29.202 
Product Responsibility 3800 46.765 0.234 20.940 44.186 72.099 99.838 29.106 
Management 3800 50.681 0.355 25.944 51.087 75.754 99.624 28.644 
Shareholders 3800 48.547 0.021 24.428 47.442 72.642 99.645 28.390 
CSR Strategy 3800 52.140 0.391 27.166 52.000 76.667 99.624 28.162 
Additional analysis: Sell-side analysts 
ANA 3504 2.431 0 2.079 2.565 2.944 4.025 0.788 
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The same transformation reveals that firm-age varies from just 2 years of existence to 177 years 
of existence with a mean age of 35 years. This further shows that firms are not just relatively 
large but also relatively mature, even though there are some very recently established firms in 
the left tail of the distribution. 
The ESG rating variables for the additional analysis regarding the role of firm-level governance 
vary from mean values of 39.578 in the community dimension to 52.140 in the CSR strategy 
dimension. Of all variables, the controversial CSR strategy category of the governance pillar, 
which the common CSR proxy does not capture, scores the highest in this sample. This 
emphasizes the relevance of a further investigation of the reasonableness of this commonly used 
proxy. Furthermore, it is striking that the dispersion of the scores decreases in the consolidation 
of categories to pillars and ultimately the ESG-combined score. This could indicate that some 
important information contained in the category scores are smoothed out when combined into 
pillar scores and investors merely relying on pillar or combined scores might fail to notice this 
information. In line with El Ghoul et al. (2017), after pointing out these features of the raw ESG 
scores, I normalise all scores for the further analysis, so that they range between 0 and 1. 
However, table 3 only illustrates them for the key independent variables, CSR and Governance 
Pillar, to preserve the readability of this thesis.  
Data regarding the number of sell-side analysts covering the company stock is only available 
for 638 individual firms with 3504 firm-year observations. ANA is also measured on a 
logarithmic scale. Transforming these values shows that the weighted-average number of sell-
side analysts covering the stock per financial year varies greatly between 1 and 56, with the 
average company being relatively extensively followed by 15 analysts. The relatively large 
average of analyst coverage is no surprise given the previous findings that the firms included 
in the final sample are relatively large and mature. 
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Table 4 below shows the mean values and the corresponding standard deviations for the two 
key variables of the analysis, TOBQ and CSR performance, for each country in panel a and 
each region in panel b. Panel a illustrates that the mean values for TOBQ range from 0.980 with 
a standard deviation of 0.210 in Egypt to 2.445 with a standard deviation of 1.824 in India. 
Interestingly, companies from Egypt also have the weakest mean value in the CSR proxy score 
of 21.192 with a standard deviation of 5.325. The highest mean value in the CSR proxy score 
is obtained by Hungary with a value of 68.062 and a standard deviation of 19.130.  
However, the number of observations for each country differs considerably. The sample 
includes 71 companies from India representing 10.81% of the overall sample (Table 2), so that 
it is relatively safe to attest a high mean firm valuation for Indian firms compared to other global 
emerging markets. This might be due to the strong GDP growth rates the Indian economy 
experienced in the past decade which are likely to drive future earnings growth and should 
ultimately be reflected in market valuations. In the other cases, the final sample merely includes 
five companies for Egypt and three companies for Hungary, both representing less than one 
percent of the overall sample. Therefore, I refrain from drawing generalized conclusions about 
firm valuation and CSR performance levels from these findings.  
Instead, panel b reveals that when countries are combined into their respective MSCI regions, 
the average values and standard deviations of both variables of EMEA and Americas are very 
similar, so that the cross-country differences when aggregated might play less of a role. 
Companies across emerging markets in Asia, however, seem to have higher average firm 
valuations than their counterparts in EMEA and the Americas. Specifically, average TOBQ of 
1.712 for Asian companies is higher than 1.578 for companies located in EMEA and 1.598 for 
companies located in the Americas. At the same time, the standard deviation of TOBQ of 1.168 
across Asian firms is considerably higher compared to the other two regions, with 0.992 for 
EMEA and 0.833 for Americas. While Asian firms enjoy relatively large valuations, these 
valuations also differ to the greatest extent from company to company. At the same time, they 
exhibit the worst average CSR performance of 43.959, which is below the 49.660 of EMEA 
and the 52.892 of Americas. The standard deviation in the CSR dimension is reasonably equal 
across all three regions.  
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Table 4: TOBQ and CSR by country and region 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the key variables of the full unbalanced data panel covering 3,800 
firm-year observations of 657 individual emerging market companies over the period from 2010-2016 used for 
baseline regression (5) by country and region. Firm valuation is the dependent variable and proxied by one-year 
ahead Tobin’s q, which is defined as 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑌+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌−𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑌
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌
 and 
collected for the financial reporting years from 2011-2017. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is the 
independent variable and proxied by Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG scores as 
𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌+𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌
2
  and collected over the period from 2010-2016. Panel a shows the 
mean and standard deviation of TOBQ and CSR in 20 different countries defined as emerging markets according 
to the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market (EM) Index classification. Panel b shows 
the mean and standard deviation of TOBQ and CSR across the three regions in which the MSCI EM index is 
divided. The raw data have been retrieved for companies in the Thomson Reuters EIKON Global Emerging Market 
Index which have their headquarters based in a country defined as emerging market by the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) Emerging Market (EM) Index classification. Next to firms with insufficient data availability, 
firms with negative Book value of Equity, TOBQ >8, and financial sector firms (GICS: Banks and Insurances) 
have been excluded. The sample is further trimmed at the top and bottom percent across SIZE and ROA. 
 
     
Panel A: Descriptive statistics by country 
 TOBQ CSR 
Country Mean SD Mean SD 
South Africa 1.881 1.161 56.199 15.408 
Malaysia 1.656 0.827 46.384 15.073 
Hong Kong 1.179 0.412 33.796 16.401 
Taiwan 1.509 0.918 40.399 22.603 
Thailand 2.158 1.456 58.909 18.610 
Philippines 1.806 0.787 45.577 20.682 
Indonesia 2.161 1.201 47.105 19.194 
India 2.445 1.824 53.942 20.748 
Czech Republic 0.996 0.141 39.780 5.211 
Russia 1.223 0.699 45.926 19.274 
Turkey 1.630 0.859 51.772 18.880 
Hungary 1.135 0.255 68.062 19.130 
Brazil 1.526 0.883 58.960 17.739 
China 1.250 0.400 36.255 17.535 
Mexico 1.919 0.836 48.711 22.199 
Egypt 0.980 0.210 21.192 5.325 
Chile 1.413 0.554 41.969 19.384 
United Arab Emirates 1.412 0.355 40.276 14.097 
Qatar 1.608 0.640 21.872 12.711 
Poland 1.169 0.709 40.876 21.560 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics by MSCI region 
 TOBQ CSR 
Region Mean SD Mean SD 
Asia 1.712 1.168 43.959 21.025 
EMEA 1.578 0.992 49.660 19.556 
Americas 1.598 0.833 52.892 20.473 
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4.2 Inferential statistics 
4.2.1 The effect of CSR performance on firm value across global emerging markets 
The first column of table 5 below presents the results of the baseline analysis, i.e. the effect of 
CSR rating performance (CSR) on one-year ahead firm value (TOBQ). Columns (2)-(4) show 
regional differences in the effect of the baseline regressions following the MSCI classified 
regions Asia, EMEA, and Americas, respectively. The constant in all specifications is relatively 
large, because the logarithmic values of total assets, i.e. SIZE, are large in absolute values 
compared to the other variables and thus shift up the regression line minimizing the weighted 
squared residuals. The adjusted R2 of the overall baseline model in column (1) amounts to 0.651, 
so the model explains a considerable portion of the overall variability of the data. All 
coefficients are statistically significant and untabulated results show that dropping control 
variables does not significantly increase the adjusted R2. 
Column (1) shows a positive CSR coefficient of 0.181, which is statistically significant at the 
1% level. Thus, a one-standard-deviation increase in normalised CSR score performance 
(0.233) of an emerging market company in this sample is – on average – associated with a 0.042 
(0.181*0.233) point increase in one-year ahead TOBQ. Compared to the mean value of 1.661 
for TOBQ across the sample, this increase constitutes around 2.5% (0.042/1.661) of that value. 
As TOBQ measures the market value of a firm’s assets over by the replacement value of the 
firm’s assets and I know that the mean and median book values of total assets for this sample 
is around USD 5.3bn, it is obvious that small changes in this measure can have large absolute 
economic impacts. Thus, the analysis attests both a statistically and economically significant 
value-enhancing effect of CSR performance across global emerging market firms. 
In line with my predictions and former research, profitability is positively related to TOBQ, and 
leverage and size are negatively related to TOBQ. A one-standard-deviation increase in ROA 
(0.073) is associated with a 0.416 (5.705*0.073) point increase in one-year ahead TOBQ. This 
large magnitude is intuitive given the sensitivity of firm valuation to profitability. A one-
standard-deviation increase in LEV (0.16) is associated with a 0.029 (0.184*0.16) point 
decrease in one-year ahead TOBQ. As LEV is also constructed as a simple ratio from the 
reporting data, firm valuation is less sensitive to LEV compared to ROA. This finding is in line 
with the study of El Ghoul et al. (2017), which find a strong effect for return on assets but only 
mild evidence for a negative effect of leverage.   
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Table 5: Baseline and regional TOBQ regressions 
The first column presents the baseline unbalanced panel regression (5) results of the effect of corporate social 
performance on firm valuation for a sample of 657 individual emerging market firms with a total of 3,800 firm-
year observations. Firm valuation is the dependent variable and proxied by one-year ahead Tobin’s q, which is 
defined as 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑌+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌−𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑌
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌
 and collected for the financial 
reporting years from 2011-2017. Corporate Social Responsibility performance (CSR) is the independent variable 
and proxied by Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG scores as 
𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌+𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌
2
  and 
collected over the period from 2010-2016. The control variables comprise Return on Assets (ROA) defined as 
Net income before extraordinary items𝑖,𝑌
Total Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌−1
, Leverage (LEV) defined as 
Total Reported Value of Debt𝑖,𝑌
Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌
, SIZE defined as the 
logarithm of 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌, GDP defined as the logarithm of  
GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD𝑖,𝑌, and Age defined as the logarithm of current Year 𝑌𝑖 −
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 . Columns (2)-(4) test for differences in the baseline effect across the three regions in 
which the 657 companies are grouped, by containing the interaction terms CSR*Asia, CSR*EMEA, 
CSR*Americas, respectively. The models are specified with Error Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) estimation 
with cross-section weights, allowing for heterogeneity in the cross-sections. Furthermore, the two-tailed p-values 
are based on robust standard errors adjusted for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the cross-sections. * and ** 
indicate significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. The raw data have been retrieved for 
companies in the Thomson Reuters EIKON Global Emerging Market Index which have their headquarters based 
in a country defined as emerging market by the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market 
(EM) Index classification. Next to firms with insufficient data availability, firms with negative Book value of 
Equity, TOBQ >8, and financial sector firms (GICS: Banks and Insurances) have been excluded. The sample is 
further trimmed at the top and bottom percent across SIZE and ROA. 
 
     
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 7.058** 6.883** 7.065** 7.295** 
CSR 0.181** 0.169** 0.235** 0.104** 
ROA 5.705** 5.654** 5.638** 5.810** 
LEV -0.184** -0.177** -0.193** -0.189** 
SIZE -0.206** -0.201** -0.211** -0.211** 
GDP -0.173** -0.168** -0.160** -0.184** 
AGE 0.076** 0.081** 0.073** 0.074** 
CSR*Asia  0.012   
CSR*EMEA   -0.257**  
CSR*Americas    0.275** 
Cross-section weights YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R2 0.651 0.630 0.624 0.679 
 
As SIZE, GDP and AGE are measured on a logarithmic scale, I assess their impact in percentage 
changes rather than standard deviations, as I find these more intuitive. A company with a one 
percent increase in SIZE is on average associated with a 0.00206 (0.206/100) point decrease in 
one-year ahead TOBQ. In contrast to El Ghoul et al. (2017), the effect of GDP is negative and 
significant in the global emerging market sample at hand. A company in a country with a one 
percent increase in GDP per capita is on average associated with a 0.00173 (0.173/100) point 
decrease in one-year ahead TOBQ. Moreover, as expected, firm age has a positive and 
significant effect on TOBQ. A company with an increase in firm age is on average associated 
with a 0.00076 (0.076/100) point increase in one-year ahead TOBQ. This result is not trivial, 
as it still amounts to 0.05% of the mean value of TOBQ. 
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Columns (2)-(4) inspect regional differences in the baseline analysis by adding the interaction 
terms CSR*Asia, CSR*EMEA, and CSR*Americas, respectively. For Asian companies, which 
represent 60% of the sample, the CSR coefficient of 0.169 only slightly differs from the baseline 
coefficient of 0.181 and the coefficient of 0.012 on CSR*Asia is not significant. Thus, the 
overall effect seems to accurately reflect the effect present among companies from Asian 
emerging markets. For companies from EMEA, which represent 20% of the sample, the CSR 
coefficient of 0.235 exceeds the baseline coefficient of 0.181 and the negative coefficient of -
0.257 on CSR*Asia is significant. Thus, the overall effect seems not to accurately reflect the 
effect present among companies in EMEA, as their individual effect amounts to -0.022 (0.235-
0.257). This coefficient is very likely to be indistinguishable from zero, so the overall value-
enhancing effect of CSR is absent for companies in EMEA. Their presence drags down the 
coefficient of the overall regression across all three regions. For companies from the Americas, 
which represent the other 20% of the sample, the CSR coefficient of 0.104 is considerably 
below the baseline coefficient of 0.181 and the positive coefficient of 0.275 on CSR*Americas 
is significant. Thus, the overall effect seems not to accurately reflect the effect present among 
companies in the Americas, as their individual effect amounts to 0.456 (0.181+0.275). Their 
presence pushes up the coefficient of the overall regression across all three regions. 
Table 6 below shows the attempt of gaining additional statistical confidence in the overall 
value-enhancing effect obtained in the baseline regression. As this is an unbalanced data panel 
with varying number of observations per period, I cannot apply the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
method of determining the simple average cross-sectional coefficient and calculate a time-series 
standard error of this average as a robustness check employed in similar analyses (e.g. Gompers 
et al., 2003). The problem of the time-varying number of observations would be eliminated in 
a balanced data panel. However, as mentioned before, due to the limited data availability and 
potential attrition bias, an unbalanced panel setup is preferable for the data at hand. While this 
trade-off between data quality and statistical ease is certainly a limitation, I can still gain 
additional confidence in the cross-sectional dimension of the baseline analysis by conducting 
year-by-year linear OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) 
adjusted standard errors. As Table 6 below shows, the coefficient of CSR is positive across all 
seven financials years.  
In five out of these seven years, the coefficients are also statistically significant. They vary from 
0.134 to 0.395 and in six out of seven years, they are higher than the coefficient of 0.181 of the 
baseline panel regression above. The adjusted R2 of the cross-sectional OLS regressions varies 
from 0.412 to 0.495 and thus remains strictly below the value of 0.651 in our baseline panel 
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regression above. This result shows that bundling the cross-sectional and time-series 
information in the data panel above increases the predictive ability of the model compared to 
year-by-year cross-sectional regressions by around 30-60%. The effect of all other variables is 
also in line with the baseline panel regression above. The only exception is leverage. While 
LEV has negative coefficients across all years, they are –  in contrast to the panel analysis – not 
significant in any of the years.  
 
Table 6: Year-by-year baseline TOBQ regressions 
This table presents the year-by-year effects of corporate social performance on firm valuation for the period of 
2010-2016. Firm valuation is the dependent variable and proxied by one-year ahead Tobin’s q, which is defined 
as  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑌+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌−𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑌
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌
 and collected for the financial reporting years 
from 2011-2017. Corporate Social Responsibility performance (CSR) is the independent variable and proxied by 
Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG scores as 
𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌+𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌
2
  and collected over the 
period from 2010-2016. Control variables comprise Return on Asset (ROA) defined as 
Net income before extraordinary items𝑖,𝑌
Total Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌−1
, Leverage (LEV) defined as 
Total Reported Value of Debt𝑖,𝑌
Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌
, SIZE defined as the 
logarithm of 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌 , GDP defined as the logarithm of 
GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD𝑖,𝑌, and Age defined as the logarithm of current Year 𝑌𝑖 −
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 . The first two columns of this table present the financial years in which the data of the 
independent variables have been collected with the respective number of observed firms. In the other columns, the 
estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients of all independent variables with the corresponding 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted (HAC) standard errors in brackets below are depicted. The last 
column depicts the adjusted R2 of the respective regression per year. * and ** indicate significance at the 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. The raw data have been retrieved for companies in the Thomson Reuters EIKON 
Global Emerging Market Index which have their headquarters based in a country defined as emerging market by 
the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market (EM) Index classification. Next to firms with 
insufficient data availability, firms with negative Book value of Equity, TOBQ >8, and financial sector firms 
(GICS: Banks and Insurances) have been excluded. The sample is further trimmed at the top and bottom percent 
across SIZE and ROA. 
 
          
YEAR N C CSR ROA LEV SIZE GDP AGE 
Adjusted 
R2 
2010 424 7.954**   0.352** 4.793** -0.125 -0.270** -0.124** 0.0756 0.426 
  (0.865) (0.151) (1.126) (0.234) (0.035) (0.042) (0.050)  
2011 470 9.638** 0.395* 5.763** -0.194 -0.332** -0.177** 0.164** 0.456 
  (1.084) (0.194) (1.068) (0.274) (0.041) (0.043) (0.059)  
2012 517 8.400** 0.134 7.806** -0.146 -0.278** -0.168** 0.134** 0.485 
  (1.091) (0.162) (1.487) (0.241) (0.035) (0.051) (0.061)  
2013 551 10.437** 0.294* 6.989** -0.601 -0.284** -0.324** 0.044 0.462 
  (1.438) (0.146) (1.857) (0.310) (0.039) (0.067) (0.062)  
2014 595 8.036** 0.055 7.304** -0.172 -0.209** -0.250** 0.018 0.412 
  (1.094) (0.137) (0.791) (0.212) (0.036) (0.047) (0.064)  
2015 618 7.530** 0.245* 8.824** -0.074 -0.198** -0.235** 0.021 0.495 
  (0.954) (0.119) (0.880) (0.168) (0.029) (0.036) (0.056)  
2016 625 8.598** 0.320* 8.010** -0.334 -0.224** -0.285** 0.047 0.430 
  (1.031) (0.152) (0.993) (0.250) (0.031) (0.045) (0.073)  
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4.2.2 The role of firm-level governance and ESG rating categories 
Table 7 below illustrates the results of several model specifications aimed at gaining a deeper 
understanding of the role of firm-level governance performance and the accuracy of the ESG 
rating methodology. First, I analyse models (1)-(3) to assess the role of firm-level governance 
rating performance on firm value. Column (1) shows that the overall ESG combined score has, 
just as the CSR proxy, a positive and significant effect on one-year ahead TOBQ. With a 
coefficient of 0.153, the effect is slightly weaker compared to the coefficient of 0.181 of the 
baseline data panel regression. A one-standard-deviation increase in normalised ESG combined 
score performance (0.198) of an emerging market company in this sample is – on average – 
associated with a 0.030 (0.153*0.198) point increase in one-year ahead TOBQ. Column (2) 
shows that when disseminating the ESG scores into the three individual pillar scores, each pillar 
yields positive and significant coefficients. The governmental pillar shows the largest 
coefficient of 0.147, followed by the environmental pillar with a coefficient of 0.080 and the 
social pillar with a coefficient of 0.065.  
Column (3) shows a positive and significant coefficient of 0.141 for the governance pillar score 
individually. A one-standard-deviation increase in normalised governance pillar score 
performance (0.222) of an emerging market company in this sample is – on average – associated 
with a 0.031 (0.141*0.222) point increase in one-year ahead TOBQ. Compared to the mean 
value of 1.661 for TOBQ across the sample, this increase constitutes around 1.9% (0.031/1.661) 
of that value and thus economically significant. Compared to the 2.5% economic impact of CSR 
in the baseline regression, the effect of firm-level governance is weaker. Interestingly, the 
governance pillar alone seems to explain more variability in TOBQ than the three pillars 
together as well as the overall ESG combined score, as shown by the highest adjusted R2 of 
0.644 in column (3). However, the differences in adjusted R2 amount only to around 5% and 
are thus marginal. 
Second, I analyse the methodology employed by Thomson Reuters in constructing their ESG 
scores by dissecting the pillar scores into their category scores in columns (4) and (5). Column 
(4) splits the governance pillar into its category scores: management, shareholders, and CSR 
strategy. While the management and CSR strategy categories both show positive and significant 
(1% level) coefficients, the shareholders category has a significant (5% level) negative effect 
of -0.045 on firm value. The positive effect at pillar level seems to be driven by the dominance 
of the positive effects of management and CSR strategy, but weakened by the shareholder 
category. However, the adjusted R2 in column (4) is slightly lower than in column (3), meaning 
that the splitting of the governance pillar does not increase the predictive power of the model.  
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In column (5), all category scores of the three pillars are included. In this specification, the 
adjusted R2 increases by around 9% to 0.673 compared to the overall ESG combined score of 
0.618 in column (1). The positive coefficients of management and CSR strategy remain 
consistent and significant, while the coefficient of the shareholder category remains negative 
with -0.025 and becomes insignificant. These results combined provide some evidence of a 
negative effect of the shareholder score on firm value. At least, the analysis suggests that the 
shareholders rating performance has no significant effect on firm valuation.  
Furthermore, column (5) reveals several inconsistencies in the categories of the other pillars. 
Notably, the emission score of the environmental pillar has a negative and significant 
coefficient, while the resource use and environmental innovation scores have a positive and 
significant coefficient. Moreover, within the social pillar, the human rights score has a negative 
effect, which is significant at the 5% level. The community score is positive and significant at 
the 1% level, whereas the product responsibility score is insignificant. These findings are in 
line with the criticism of Utz (2017) and Attig et al. (2013) and suggests that the rating 
methodology of Thomson Reuters might not be ideal in terms of accuracy and that the common 
CSR proxy above is contestable. 
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Table 7: Firm-level governance and ESG rating categories TOBQ regressions 
This table presents the unbalanced panel regression results of the effect of various Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG 
rating scores on firm valuation for a sample of 657 individual emerging market firms with a total of 3,800 firm-
year observations. Firm valuation is the dependent variable and proxied by one-year ahead Tobin’s q (TOBQ), 
which is defined as 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑌+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌−𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑌
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌
 and collected for the financial 
reporting years from 2011-2017. The Thomson Reuters ESG combined score (row 7), the three pillar level scores 
Environmental, Social, and Governance (rows 8-10) as well as the ten category level scores Resource Use, 
Emissions, Environmental Innovation, Workforce, Human Rights, Community, Product Responsibility, 
Management, Shareholders, and CSR Strategy (rows 11-20) are the dependent variables and collected for the 
financial reporting years from 2010-2016. All these scores that originally range from 0-100 and are assessed 
relative to their industry peers, have been normalised to range from 0-1. A detailed overview of the methodology 
of the Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG ratings can be found in Appendix B. Control variables comprise Return on 
Asset (ROA) defined as 
Net income before extraordinary items𝑖,𝑌
Total Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌−1
, Leverage (LEV) defined as 
Total Reported Value of Debt𝑖,𝑌
Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌
, SIZE defined as the logarithm of 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌 , GDP defined as the 
logarithm of  GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD𝑖,𝑌, and Age defined as the logarithm of current Year 𝑌𝑖 −
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 . The models are specified with Error Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) estimation with 
cross-section weights, allowing for heterogeneity in the cross-sections. Furthermore, the two-tailed p-values are 
based on robust standard errors adjusted for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the cross-sections. * and ** 
indicate significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. The raw data have been retrieved for 
companies in the Thomson Reuters EIKON Global Emerging Market Index which have their headquarters based 
in a country defined as emerging market by the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market 
(EM) Index classification. Next to firms with insufficient data availability, firms with negative Book value of 
Equity, TOBQ >8, and financial sector firms (GICS: Banks and Insurances) have been excluded. The sample is 
further trimmed at the top and bottom percent across SIZE and ROA. 
 
      
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
C 6.730** 6.761** 6.822** 6.845** 6.833** 
ROA 5.571** 5.584** 5.508** 5.528** 5.925** 
LEV -0.204** -0.149** -0.150** -0.160** -0.064 
SIZE -0.192** -0.199** -0.204** -0.199** -0.208** 
GDP -0.173** -0.169** -0.165** -0.174** -0.161** 
AGE 0.089** 0.089** 0.112** 0.093** 0.081** 
ESG combined score 0.153**     
Environmental Pillar (E)  0.080**    
Social Pillar (S)  0.065*    
Governance Pillar (G)  0.147** 0.141**   
Resource Use     0.217** 
Emissions     -0.228** 
Environmental Innovation     0.203** 
Workforce     -0.013 
Human Rights     -0.067* 
Community     0.137** 
Product Responsibility     -0.013 
Management    0.152** 0.119** 
Shareholders    -0.045* -0.025 
CSR Strategy    0.077** 0.049** 
Cross-section weights YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R2 0.618 0.621 0.644 0.620 0.673 
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4.2.3 The role of sell-side analysts on CSR and firm value 
The results of Table 8 below, relating to the role of sell-side analysts in the context of CSR and 
firm value, are based on the smaller sample size of 638 individual firms with 3504 firm-year 
observations. Column (1) repeats the baseline regression applied to this smaller sample. The 
CSR performance coefficient is positive and significant with 0.142, which is slightly below the 
0.181 found for the full sample. 
In column (2), CSR is dropped, and ANA is added instead. The coefficient of 0.016 on ANA is 
significant at the 1% level. The adjusted R2 increases from 0.632 to 0.663. Ignoring CSR, a 
company with a one percent increase in the number of sell-side analysts is – on average – 
associated with a 0.00156 (0.156/100) point increase in one-year ahead TOBQ. In column (3), 
ANA is added next to CSR to the baseline model in column (1). Compared to model (1), the 
coefficient of CSR drops from 0.142 to 0.104 and remains significant. Compared to model (2), 
the coefficient of ANA only decreases marginally from 0.016 to 0.015. The adjusted R2 
increases compared to the baseline model from 0.632 to 0.654 but decreases compared to 
column (2) from 0.663 to 0.654. All in all, the value-enhancing effect of analyst coverage for 
global emerging market companies seems to be robust.  
In column (4), I include an additional interaction term CSR*ANA to the model of column (3) 
to inspect whether the number of analysts reinforces or mitigates the positive effect of CSR on 
firm value. Both the CSR coefficient of 0.223 and the ANA coefficient of 0.020 show the 
strongest individual positive effect compared to the other specifications (1)-(3). The interaction 
coefficient on CSR*ANA loads negatively with -0.009 and is significant at the 5% level. Thus, 
the number of analysts has a mitigating effect on the positive relation between CSR 
performance and firm valuation, supporting the view that both analysts as external monitors in 
economies with weak institutions and CSR as internal strategic response to overcome 
institutional voids are partly substitutes for each other. Specifically, a 100 percent increase in 
the number of sell-side analysts covering an emerging market company in this sample on 
average decreases the positive effect of CSR on one-year TOBQ by 0.009 from 0.223 to 0.194.  
In this specification, the adjusted R2 increases to its highest value of 0.688 within the whole 
inferential analysis. However, the models of the baseline analysis and the role of firm-level 
governance are not directly comparable in terms of adjusted R2, because they are based on a 
slightly larger sample. In summary, both CSR performance and the number of analysts 
individually and together are associated with higher valuations and ANA has a mitigating effect 
on the positive relation between CSR and firm value. 
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Table 8: Analyst TOBQ regressions 
This table presents the additional analysis on the role of analyst coverage on the effect of corporate social 
performance on firm valuation for a reduced sample of 638 individual emerging market firms with a total of 3,504 
firm-year observations. Firm valuation is the dependent variable and proxied by one-year ahead Tobin’s q, which 
is defined as 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑌+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌−𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑌
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌
 and collected for the financial 
reporting years from 2011-2017. Corporate Social Responsibility performance (CSR) is the independent variable 
and proxied by Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG scores as 
𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌+𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌
2
  and 
collected over the period from 2010-2016. Control variables comprise Return on Asset (ROA) defined as 
Net income before extraordinary items𝑖,𝑌
Total Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌−1
, Leverage (LEV) defined as 
Total Reported Value of Debt𝑖,𝑌
Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌
, SIZE defined as the 
logarithm of 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌 , GDP defined as the logarithm of 
GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD𝑖,𝑌, and Age defined as the logarithm of current Year 𝑌𝑖 −
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 . Analyst coverage (ANA) is defined as the logarithm of the 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 −
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌 that is covering the stock of the company in the respective financial 
years 2010-2016. Column (1) tests the baseline regression model (5) for this reduced sample. Columns (2)-(3) test 
the effect of ANA on TOBQ independently of and next to CSR. Column (4) tests the effect of ANA on the effect 
of CSR on TOBQ by containing an interaction term CSR*ANA. The models are specified with Error Generalized 
Least Squares (EGLS) estimation with cross-section weights, allowing for heterogeneity in the cross-sections. 
Furthermore, the two-tailed p-values are based on robust standard errors adjusted for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the cross-sections. * and ** indicate significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. The raw data have been retrieved for companies in the Thomson Reuters EIKON Global Emerging 
Market Index which have their headquarters based in a country defined as emerging market by the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market (EM) Index classification. Next to firms with insufficient data 
availability, firms with negative Book value of Equity, TOBQ >8, and financial sector firms (GICS: Banks and 
Insurances) have been excluded. The sample is further trimmed at the top and bottom percent across SIZE and 
ROA. 
 
     
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 7.060** 6.991** 6.912** 6.912** 
CSR 0.142**  0.104** 0.223** 
ROA 5.812** 5.642** 5.659** 5.773** 
LEV -0.171** -0.075** -0.054 -0.013 
SIZE -0.212** -0.239** -0.240** -0.241** 
GDP -0.152** -0.117** -0.106** -0.114** 
AGE 0.063** 0.113** 0.107** 0.109** 
ANA  0.016** 0.015** 0.020** 
CSR*ANA    -0.009* 
Cross-section weights YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R2 0.632 0.663 0.654 0.688 
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5. Discussion & Limitations 
 
First, the discussion chapter uses the statistical results described in the previous section to 
confirm or to reject the hypotheses developed in the literature review and provides a subjective 
interpretation of the results in the context of the discussed literature. This is done in a 
chronological structure from hypothesis one to four. Second, a critical review of the methods 
and concepts applied in the analysis, together with their limitations, are presented. 
 
H1: CSR performance is positively related to firm value across global emerging markets 
The baseline regression (5) in the first column of table 5 shows a positive and significant 
coefficient for the CSR proxy. This effect is also evident in the reduced sample for the additional 
analysis on the role of analysts illustrated in the first column of table 8. Furthermore, the year-
by-year cross-sectional regressions with OLS estimators and HAC robust standard errors of 
table 6 show positive coefficients in all seven years, where five of them are statistically 
significant. Therefore, the positive effect of hypothesis 1 is confirmed across two samples and 
methodologies. In this sample of global emerging market companies, CSR performance is 
positively related to (subsequent) firm valuation.  
However, columns (2)-(4) of table 5 reveal that this overall result masks some important 
regional differences. Specifically, while the effect of Asian companies is in line with the overall 
results, there seems to be no effect or even a negative effect between CSR and TOBQ for 
companies in the EMEA region and a pronounced positive effect for companies in the Americas 
region. This result has far-reaching consequences for the generalization of the results. First, it 
casts doubt on the practice of treating global emerging market companies as a group due to their 
institutional differences. Second, it illustrates the ESG data problem in emerging markets. 
While it would be interesting to further inspect the factors driving the diverging results in 
EMEA and the Americas, both regions individually represent only 20% of the already relatively 
small sample. Thus, conducting separate empirical analyses with high statistical power is 
difficult.  
My main finding of the baseline regression provides empirical evidence for and is consistent 
with the resource-based view of CSR and is the first to inspect the CSP and CFP debate across 
global emerging markets. Emerging markets are generally characterized by weaker market 
supporting institutions supporting economic exchanges. This often results in governance 
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concerns and ultimately higher risk of expropriation of minority shareholders. Consequently, 
economic exchanges undertaken of and with these companies endure higher transaction costs 
and they suffer from worse access to resources. To prevent undue transaction costs, emerging 
market firms must take strategic actions to mitigate these concerns. My analysis shows that 
acting responsibly is such a strategic response, as emerging market companies across the globe 
with superior CSR performance enjoy higher firm valuations. As such, it lends support to the 
recent findings of El Ghoul et al. (2017), that CSR initiatives reduce transaction costs and 
improve access to resources in countries with weak institutions, which increases firm value. At 
the same time, regional differences persist, and the above dynamics probably hold for emerging 
market companies across Asia and the Americas but might not hold for companies in the EMEA 
region. 
In line with El Ghoul et al. (2017), I find a positive relationship between profitability and firm 
value. In fact, there is strong empirical evidence for this relationship, as ROA yields a positive 
and significant coefficient across the entire baseline and additional analyses. As expected, firms 
that are more profitable have more scope to pay dividends, invest in necessary R&D projects to 
ensure future growth and to sustain adverse market movements, so they enjoy higher valuations. 
Further in line with El Ghoul et al. (2017), I find milder evidence for a negative relationship 
between leverage and subsequent firm valuation. LEV shows a negative and significant 
coefficient in almost all panel regression specifications across the baseline and additional 
analyses. However, although coefficients of the year-by-year regressions in table 6 are negative 
in all years, they are not significant. All in all, the analyses support the rationale that an increase 
in leverage limits the flexibility of management decisions and renders firms to be more 
vulnerable to market shocks, resulting in lower valuation. 
In line with El Ghoul et al. (2017), I find strong evidence that smaller emerging market 
companies have higher firm valuations. Just like for ROA, this relationship is significant across 
the entire baseline and additional analyses. As expected, larger firms have more limited 
investment opportunities and lower future growth prospects. Lower expected future cash flows 
translate into lower firm valuations. In line with Gompers et al. (2003), I find relatively strong 
empirical evidence for a positive effect of firm age on firm value in this emerging market 
sample. AGE shows a positive and significant coefficient in all panel regressions and in two 
out of seven year-by-year OLS regressions. As expected, more established firms in emerging 
markets can draw on a larger history of treating stakeholders fairly and thus mitigate concerns 
about expropriation, which results in higher firm valuation. 
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In contrast to El Ghoul et al. (2017), I find strong evidence for a negative relationship between 
economic development proxied by the logarithm of GDP per capita and TOBQ for my sample 
of exclusively emerging market companies. To illustrate, the observation with the lowest GDP 
per capita belongs to India with USD 1,344, while the observation with the highest GDP per 
capita belongs to Qatar with USD 70,306 (both in constant 2010 USD). While both are being 
classified as emerging markets according to the MSCI EM index scheme used, the average 
person in Qatar produces more than 50 times as much GDP as an average person in India. This 
illustrates the wide range of economic development across the countries MSCI defines as 
emerging. At the same time, GDP grew by 46% during the sampling period in India and fell by 
7% in Qatar. The emerging countries at the bottom of the economic development have been 
shown to yield higher growth potential than almost fully developed countries. Strong income 
growth drives domestic demand and thus expected growth of domestic companies, which 
results in higher expected future cash flows and is ultimately reflected in higher firm valuations. 
Therefore, the wide dispersion in development levels in the MSCI classified emerging markets 
with their different associated growth prospects provide rationale for this negative effect.  
 
H2: Firm-level governance rating performance has a positive effect on firm value across global 
emerging markets 
In line with the theoretical suggestion of Ding et al. (2010) that firm-level governance is 
especially important in emerging markets plagued by institutional voids and the empirical 
finding of Kim et al. (2014) that in the U.S., governance ratings are associated with lower firm 
risk, I find that across emerging market companies, governance rating performance is positively 
associated with subsequent firm valuation. The governance pillar in table 7 shows a positive 
and significant coefficient when regressed with the other two pillars in column (2) as well as 
when regressed separately in column (3). Thus, the analysis confirms hypothesis 2. 
At the same time, I find some evidence that the category scores incorporated in the governance 
pillar are based on the traditional developed markets governance model dominated by PA 
conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but fail to properly incorporate the institutional 
environment of emerging markets which results in the dominance of PP conflicts (Young et al., 
2008). When regressing the separate categories of the governance pillar on TOBQ in column 
(4) of table 7, the shareholders score has a significant negative coefficient, but the adjusted R2 
decreases. When regressing all category scores on TOBQ in column (5), this coefficient is still 
negative, but insignificant. These results favour the view that unlike attested for developed 
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markets, more power of shareholders vs. manager across global emerging markets is not 
associated with better firm performance, or even detrimental to firm performance (e.g. Faccio 
et al., 2001). As explained above, emerging market companies are often dominated by majority 
shareholders belonging to influential families or the state. In that context, even higher 
shareholder power could for example mean that these majority shareholders steer business 
according to their personal interests and might put affiliated state officials or family members 
in the board of directors, rather than acting in the interest of all shareholders. This is likely to 
lead to poor strategic choices or expropriation of minority shareholders and ultimately results 
in lower firm valuations. 
Columns (3)-(4) of table 7 show that the CSR strategy score, which TR includes in the 
governance pillar and which is therefore not included in my CSR proxy, is positive and 
significant. As explained before, CSR strategy refers for example to the establishment of a 
sustainability committee, voluntarily disclosures, or sustainability audits. As such, a positive 
and significant effect of this category score might be regarded as additional confirmatory 
evidence for hypothesis 1. However, it also gives rise to criticism regarding the common 
practice in academic studies of using the average of the environmental and social pillars as CSR 
proxy, as this category score is part of the governance pillar but seems to capture important 
parts of CSR activity. 
Furthermore, column (4) of table 7 provides evidence in line with the criticism of Utz et al. 
(2017) and Attig et al. (2013), that some category scores yield contradictory signs when 
compared to their pillar scores. While there is a theoretical rationale for the negative effect of 
the shareholder score on firm value in emerging markets, I find no such explanation for the 
negative and significant effects of the resource use score and the human rights score on firm 
valuation. Simultaneously, disaggregating the scores into all categories yields additional 
predictive power, as the adjusted R2 of 0.673 is the highest across the different model 
specifications. Thus, the inconsistent category scores can explain more variation in firm value 
than the pillar scores and the ESG combined score. Thus, practitioners and academics need to 
be careful when using TR ESG scores in their investment decisions. The CSR proxy based on 
the TR methodology might not be ideal as the environmental and social pillars are not capturing 
important parts of CSR activity contained in the governmental category CSR strategy. 
Furthermore, lower-level category scores are in some cases inconsistent with the pillar scores. 
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H3: Analyst coverage has a positive effect on firm value across global emerging markets 
Table 8 provides strong evidence for a positive effect of the number of sell-side analysts on 
firm valuation across global emerging markets and thus confirms hypothesis 3. This positive 
effect is consistent across all three model specifications in columns (2)-(4). It only varies 
marginally between 0.015 and 0.020 and is significant at the 1% level. In line with Chung and 
Jo (1996) and Yu (2008), this result suggests that equity analysts act as an external monitor and 
help reducing agency costs, disciplining managers and steering investor attention towards 
important information. The results contrast the view of Chan and Hameed (2006), which states 
that analysts fail to produce firm-specific information in emerging economies that is being 
valued by the market. 
 
H4: Analyst coverage amplifies the positive effect of CSR on firm value across global emerging 
markets 
Column (4) of table 8 shows a negative coefficient of -0.009 on the interaction term of 
CSR*ANA and adjusted R2 increases to 0.688. This coefficient is significant at the 5% level, 
so I reject hypothesis 4. Instead, analyst coverage mitigates the effect of CSR on firm value 
across global emerging markets. This mitigating effect can be explained by the rationale of Jo 
and Harjoto (2014), who state that while analysts are primarily concerned with financial 
information, they provide indirect but additional social pressure on firms to reduce their 
irresponsible activities. While their analysis was confined to a sample of U.S. firms, this seems 
to hold true across global emerging markets as well. The results suggest that analysts perform 
to a certain degree the same task as ESG rating agencies, i.e. signalling trust to the marketplace 
that the covered company is well governed and bears little risk of minority shareholder 
expropriation.  
At the same time, the individual positive effects of CSR and ANA on firm value found in 
column (3) of table 8 remain significant when including the interaction term CSR*ANA in 
column (4). Thus, despite ANA mitigating the positive effect of CSR on firm value, both 
information intermediaries individually add value to the firm. This is supportive for the claim 
of Berk and DeMarzo (2011), that the primary role of equity analysts is to uncover any financial 
reporting irregularities, rather than providing elaborate ESG information. Consequently, while 
analysts seem to provide some additional social pressure on firms to reduce their irresponsible 
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activities and signal trust in the proper governance of the firm, they rather complement ESG 
rating agencies by focussing on financial reporting irregularities. 
 
There are several limitations I acknowledge regarding my empirical analysis. First, my 
classification of emerging market countries based on the MSCI EM index methodology is very 
broad. As mentioned earlier, economic development, when measured as GDP per capita in 
constant 2010 USD ranges from USD 1,344 in India to more than 50 times that value, i.e. USD 
70,306, in Qatar. Despite being widely used in academic research, this classification scheme is 
contestable and future research could define emerging markets more narrowly to produce 
additional confidence in the results obtained. Furthermore, the descriptive analysis in table 3 
shows that the companies covered do have an average and median book value of assets of 
around USD 5.3bn, have been existing on average for 35 years, and are being followed – on 
average – by 15 sell-side analysts. Thus, my results could be limited to relatively large and 
mature companies rather than to hold for the entire spectrum of emerging market firms and 
should therefore be treated with caution.  
Furthermore, the inferential analysis of table 5 shows that the overall positive effect of CSR 
performance on firm value of the baseline regression is driven by the dominant 60% share of 
Asian companies in the sample. The effect seems to be considerably stronger for companies in 
the Americas and non-existent for companies in EMEA. As such, the treatment of global 
emerging markets as a group is contestable and further research on the underlying reasons for 
the regional differences is needed. Moreover, I find and recognise drawbacks of using the 
common CSR proxy of taking the average of the environmental and social pillar scores in table 
6. Nevertheless, I rely on this proxy in the other analyses. Therefore, my results only hold to 
the extent to which this proxy really does represent CSR performance. Besides, as mentioned 
before, there is a lack of data on institutional shareholdings. Consequently, this analysis misses 
to inspect the role of this important external governance mechanism. 
Furthermore, a potentially endogenous relationship between CSR and TOBQ is a concern in 
my analysis. Endogeneity broadly refers to situations in which an explanatory variable is 
correlated with the error term, which can inflict bias in regression estimates and is mostly 
caused by omitted variables, reverse causality, or simultaneity. Specifically, endogeneity would 
arise due to unobservable heterogeneity from omitted firm-specific variables that are correlated 
with CSR and TOBQ. Endogeneity from reverse causality would arise when superior financial 
performance causes firms to improve their CSR performance, rather than superior CSR 
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performance resulting in higher firm valuation. Endogeneity from simultaneity would arise 
when CSR and TOBQ are jointly determined, i.e. CSR performance and firm value 
simultaneously affect each other (Dimson et al., 2015). 
My research design helps to mitigate concerns about omitted firm-level heterogeneity by 
including numerous control variables identified in similar previous studies that tested for 
endogeneity. Nevertheless, it is possible that omitted country-level factors affect both CSR and 
TOBQ and drive the results. More advanced econometrical methods of recent studies (e.g., El 
Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2017), such as instrumental variable 
techniques or dynamic panel generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimations could be 
employed to further rule out omitted variable concerns. However, employing these methods 
extends the scope of this thesis and I recognise that as a limitation of my analysis. The same 
omitted variable problem also applies to the additional analyses regarding the relationship of 
the firm-level governance and TOBQ as well as ANA and TOBQ. 
To address the reverse causality and simultaneity problems, I follow previous research (e.g. 
Kim et al., 2014; El Ghoul et al., 2017) and use a one-period lag between the dependent 
variables including the CSR performance proxy and the independent variable TOBQ. 
Nevertheless, this practice is imperfect since CSR scores are quite sticky across years. Besides, 
while the EGLS specification of my unbalanced panel regression solves the problem of 
heteroskedasticity in the remainder error term of the cross-section fixed effect specification and 
reduces the Jarque-Bera statistic, the normality assumption of the residuals is still slightly 
violated.  
  
58 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The conclusion chapter is structured as follows. First, it synthesizes the context of the academic 
debate around which the analysis revolves and points out how the findings of the main and 
additional analyses contribute to the respective existing literature streams and what implications 
they have on future academic research. Second, recommendations for practitioners are derived. 
Third, motivations for future research are presented. Limitations have already been stated on 
the previous two pages and are therefore not repeated in this chapter. 
While there is a large body of research on the CSP and CFP debate in developed markets 
producing mixed results, research on the CSP and CFP debate in emerging markets is scarce. 
So far, recent studies merely relate to stock price crash risk and are confined to individual 
emerging markets (Zhang, Xie, and Xu, 2016; Lee, 2016). CSR research on emerging markets 
as a group is absent. This is probably due to the failure to recognize institutional commonalities 
across global emerging market companies, ESG data scarcity in emerging markets and the 
extremely volatile capital markets in the last decade steering the focus on risk characteristics. 
From an academic perspective, the main analysis of my thesis contributes to the current stance 
of research by revitalizing the traditional deadlocked CSP and CFP debate in developed markets 
by focussing on emerging markets and on the so far untouched post-financial crisis period of 
2010-2016.  
The rationale to conduct research across global emerging markets as a group is an extension of 
the link between institutional theory, transaction cost theory and the CSP and CFP debate 
recently found by El Ghoul et al. (2017). The absence of market-supporting institutions in an 
economy often results in governance concerns and ultimately higher risk of expropriation of 
minority shareholders of companies in that economy. Consequently, economic exchanges 
undertaken of and with these companies endure higher transaction costs and they suffer from 
worse access to resources. El Ghoul et al. (2017) claims that the traditional performance 
channels proposed by the resource-based view of CSR like superior management 
incentivization, moral capital, information quality, transparency, and trust, are expected to work 
particularly well in the presence of institutional voids. They find that CSR constitutes a strategic 
response to reduce the undue transaction costs associated with the absence of institutions and 
creates necessary resources which ultimately result in higher firm valuation. As global 
emerging markets as a group generally have relatively weak institutions (e.g. Meyer et al., 
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2009), I posit that CSR performance across global emerging market companies is positively 
related to firm valuation. 
Indeed, I find that CSR performance proxied by the average of the environmental and social 
pillar scores of the Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG rating database positively relates to firm 
valuation proxied by one-year ahead Tobin’s q (TOBQ). Specifically, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in normalised CSR score performance of an emerging market company in this sample 
is – on average – associated with a 0.042-point increase in one-year ahead TOBQ. However, 
this overall result is largely driven by the Asian companies representing around 60% of the 
sample. Companies located in EMEA do not show any value enhancing effect of CSR and 
companies located in the Americas show an especially strong value enhancing effect of CSR. 
My main contribution is to enhance the current stance of research by revitalizing the deadlocked 
CSP and CFP debate in developed markets. First, my study is the first study to provide empirical 
evidence for the resource-based view of CSR in the so far untouched post-financial crisis period 
of 2010-2016. Second, it is the first study that examines the link between CSR performance and 
firm value across global emerging markets. It implies that future research should recognize that 
in contrast to earlier suggestions (e.g. Baughn et al., 2007), emerging economies are sensitive 
about CSR issues and that CSR performance is value-enhancing in those markets. At the same 
time, it shows that large regional differences in this link do exist and that there is a need for 
more extensive ESG data to conduct meaningful statistical analyses on regional level. 
Furthermore, it provides confirmatory evidence for the proposed link between institutions and 
transaction costs proposed by El Ghoul et al. (2017) and implies that future research on CSR 
should recognize that the effectiveness of CSR performance channels depends on the 
institutional context of the economy in which a company is located in.  
The additional analysis on firm-level governance scores contributes to the corporate governance 
and institutional theory literature. In line with suggestions that the need for effective internal 
corporate governance is especially high in countries where institutional voids inhibit market 
oversight or external governance (Ding et al., 2010), I find a positive effect of firm-level 
governance scores on firm valuation. At the same time, further empirical tests suggest that 
Thomson Reuters ESG scores are based on the traditional developed markets governance model 
dominated by PA conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but fail to properly incorporate the 
institutional environment of emerging markets which results in the dominance of PP conflicts 
(Young et al., 2008). The negative effect of the shareholders category score supports the view 
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of Faccio et al. (2001) that power towards shareholders vs. managers in emerging markets 
increases PP conflicts instead of solving PA conflicts.  
It implies for future research on corporate governance, that institutions, amongst other factors, 
effect the governance requirements of companies and that these dynamics potentially prevent 
generic governance scores from being universally applicable across different countries and 
regions.  Furthermore, the analysis finds further evidence in line with the criticism of Utz et al. 
(2017) and Attig et al. (2013), that some category scores yield contradictory signs compared to 
their pillar scores. For studies in both developed and emerging markets, academics should 
recognize that the commonly used CSR proxy of taking the average of the environmental and 
social pillar scores does not incorporate the CSR strategy component attributed to the 
governance pillar even though it should conceptually include it, and that analyses on category 
score level might produce misleading results. 
Finally, this thesis contributes to the CSP and CFP debate by introducing another previously 
untouched aspect which relates to the information intermediary role of ESG rating agencies, 
i.e. analyst coverage. In line with Chung and Jo (1996) and Yu (2008), who suggest that equity 
analysts act as an external monitor and help reducing agency costs, disciplining managers, and 
steering investor attention towards important (financial) information, I find strong evidence for 
a positive effect of the number of sell-side analysts on firm valuation (next to CSR). I further 
find empirical support for a mitigating impact of analyst coverage on the positive effect of CSR 
and firm value, while the individual coefficients remain positive and significant. This implies 
that while analysts seem to provide some additional social pressure on firms to reduce their 
irresponsible activities and signal trust in the proper governance of the firm, they rather 
complement than substitute ESG rating agencies as information intermediaries by focussing on 
financial reporting irregularities. It implies that future research on financial performance or 
transaction costs in emerging markets should recognize that both analyst coverage and CSR 
performance help reduce transaction costs and create resources that are valued by the market.  
From a practitioner’s perspective, my findings have several implications on portfolio managers 
of institutional investors and managers of emerging market companies. When allocating capital 
to equities of emerging market companies, portfolio managers should pick stocks of companies 
with strong future CSR capabilities, large analyst coverage, and conduct firm-level governance 
analyses considering PP problems rather than (relying on generic governance scores based 
primarily on) PA problems. Alternatively, the findings could be an artefact of portfolio 
managers already incorporating these factors in their stock picking process. If they provide 
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immense amounts of capital to socially responsible emerging market companies that are largely 
covered by analysts, they drive the market values of these companies, which is reflected in 
Tobin’s q. Moreover, the analysis implies that practitioners who rely on Thomson Reuters 
EIKON ESG scores in their investment decisions should use them with caution, as governance 
scores based on a developed corporate governance model might be inaccurate for assessing the 
corporate governance quality of emerging market companies.  
For managers of emerging market companies, the analysis is relevant for their strategic 
decision-making process, growth strategies, and capital budget allocations. My support for the 
resource-based view of CSR calls on managers in emerging markets to strive for more CSR 
excellence, which necessitates a strategic planning process. Managers of emerging market firms 
seeking capital to finance identified growth opportunities might be well advised to increase 
performance and communication of their CSR commitments to attract the desired capital. 
Finally, the results immediately effect the capital budgeting process for managers deciding how 
much resources to commit to CSR related activities. 
Beyond tackling the issues immediately addressing the limitations presented in the previous 
section (especially endogeneity), this study opens the gateway to a broad future research area. 
As mentioned before, it is a pioneering study in inspecting the CSP and CFP debate in the 
context of global emerging markets. Compared to previous research using data panels, the 
sample construction of an unbalanced data panel with as much as 3,800 firm-year observations 
shows that the data availability reached a tipping point where it is possible to conduct 
meaningful analyses. Thus, numerous previous studies on CSR could be inspected in the 
context of global emerging markets. One recent example would be to inspect the relationship 
between CSR and stock price crash risk for this sample.  
Besides, further research could be dedicated to an elaborate investigation of the regional 
differences between the value relevance of CSR that have been revealed in this study. However, 
more data would be needed than is currently accessible through Thomson Reuters EIKON. 
Furthermore, future research could be conducted to find better proxies for CSR by for example 
trying to combine the CSR strategy component score of the governmental pillar with the 
environmental and social pillars. Alternatively, there might be opportunities to construct better 
CSR proxies from different databases. On top of that, future research could be conducted on 
institutional shareholdings as another external monitoring mechanism across global emerging 
markets.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: MSCI EM region clustering 
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Appendix B: Thomson Reuters EIKON ESG score methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Retrieved on 14.10.2018 from  
https://www.refinitiv.com/content/dam/gl/en/documents/methodology/esg-scores-
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Appendix C: Variable overview 
 
General 
company 
information 
• RIC (Reuters Identifier code) 
• Unique Company Name 
• TRBC Business Sector Name 
• Country 
• Region: Asia, Americas, EMEA (see Appendix A)  
Market & 
Fundamental 
data  
All variables are downloaded in USD for comparability: 
•  𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑌 =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑌+𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌−𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑌
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌
 
• 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑌 =
Net income before extraordinary items𝑖,𝑌
Total Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌−1
 
• 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑌 = 𝑙𝑛 (𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌) 
• 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑌 =
Total Reported Value of Debt𝑖,𝑌
Book Value of Assets𝑖,𝑌
 
• 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑌 = ln( respective GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD𝑖,𝑌) 
• 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑌 = ln( 𝑌𝑖 − 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖) 
• 𝐴𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑌 = ln(𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 − 𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌) 
 
ESG data  All raw scores are relative the respective firm’s industry peers and on a scale from 0-100. I 
normalised them to range between 0-1. 
• 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑌 =
𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌+𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑌
2
 
Environmental pillar categories:  
• 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑌, 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑌, 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑌 
Social pillar categories: 
• 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑌, 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑌, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑌, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑌 
Governance pillar categories: 
• 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑌, 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑌, 𝐶𝑆𝑅 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦𝑖,𝑌 
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Appendix D: Breusch-Pagan test for Random Effects 
 
Lagrange Multiplier Tests for Random Effects 
Null hypotheses: No effects  
Alternative hypotheses: Two-sided (Breusch-Pagan) and one-sided 
        (all others) alternatives  
    
     Test Hypothesis 
 Cross-section Time Both 
    
    Breusch-Pagan  3690.646  47.80646  3738.452 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
Honda  60.75069  6.914222  47.84632 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
King-Wu  60.75069  6.914222  12.84754 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
Standardized Honda  60.90924  7.861114  35.20290 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  
   (0.0000) 
    
Standardized King-Wu  60.90924  7.861114  10.31710 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
    
Gourierioux, et al.* -- --  3738.452 
   (< 0.01) 
    
    *Mixed chi-square asymptotic critical values: 
1% 7.289   
5% 4.321   
10% 2.952   
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Appendix E: Heteroskedasticity and Normality in the fixed effects OLS model 
 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 09/20/18   Time: 12:55   
Sample: 2010 2016   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 657   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3800  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.135483 0.085856 13.22538 0.0000 
CSR^2 0.041158 0.033243 1.238071 0.2158 
ROA^2 3.472582 0.264709 13.11850 0.0000 
LEV^2 -0.271950 0.072735 -3.738925 0.0002 
SIZE^2 -0.001546 0.000137 -11.24631 0.0000 
GDP^2 -0.003426 0.000466 -7.349656 0.0000 
AGE^2 0.003248 0.001799 1.805608 0.0711 
     
     R-squared 0.118056    Mean dependent var 0.132740 
Adjusted R-squared 0.116661    S.D. dependent var 0.460751 
S.E. of regression 0.433042    Akaike info criterion 1.165875 
Sum squared resid 711.2829    Schwarz criterion 1.177375 
Log likelihood -2208.163    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.169962 
F-statistic 84.62148    Durbin-Watson stat 1.240603 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix F: Heteroskedasticity and Normality in the WLS model 
 
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 09/20/18   Time: 12:46   
Sample: 2010 2016   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 657   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3800  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 3.80E+41 1.77E+41 2.144670 0.0320 
CSR^2 -5.23E+40 6.87E+40 -0.761587 0.4464 
ROA^2 1.57E+41 5.47E+41 0.286719 0.7743 
LEV^2 -1.67E+40 1.50E+41 -0.111184 0.9115 
SIZE^2 -5.03E+38 2.84E+38 -1.769385 0.0769 
GDP^2 -1.36E+39 9.63E+38 -1.416655 0.1567 
AGE^2 1.52E+39 3.72E+39 0.408673 0.6828 
     
     R-squared 0.001958    Mean dependent var 1.94E+40 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000379    S.D. dependent var 8.95E+41 
S.E. of regression 8.95E+41    Akaike info criterion 196.0343 
Sum squared resid 3.04E+87    Schwarz criterion 196.0458 
Log likelihood -372458.3    Hannan-Quinn criter. 196.0384 
F-statistic 1.240132    Durbin-Watson stat 1.409558 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.282280    
     
     
 
 
 
